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In 2015, the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
Standardization Association made some controversial changes to its patent
policy. The changes include a recommended method of calculation of
FRAND royalty rates, and a request to members holding a standard-
essential patent to forego their right to seek an injunction except under
limited circumstances. The updated policy was adopted by the IEEE Board
of Directors after obtaining a favourable Business Review Letter by the US
Department of Justice, which found any potential competitive harm from
the policy to be outweighed by potential pro-competitive beneﬁts. In this
paper, we examine whether the same favourable conclusion would be
reached under EU competition analysis. After discussing the role of patent
policies of standard-setting organizations and the rules and principles
applicable to the IEEE’s activities, the paper concludes that standardization
agreements based on the updated policy may constitute a violation of article
101 TFEU.
Keywords: standard-setting organizations; standard-essential patents;
licensing policies of SSOs; EC guidelines on horizontal cooperation;
horizontal agreements
1. Introduction
In a world of complex and multifaceted technological development, a certain
degree of industry coordination is vital for economic progress. The ever-expand-
ing role of information and communication technology (ICT) in our economy, in
particular, is such that an increasing number of products and services build upon
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the technical speciﬁcations developed by pre-existing technology. This type of
incremental innovation is stimulated by the operation of standard-setting organiz-
ations (SSOs), which serve as a platform for coordinated development of
interoperability standards.1 At the same time, SSOs set up private regimes with
far-reaching market implications, raising new challenges for antitrust
enforcement.2
The extensive reliance on interoperability standards in this complex techno-
logical environment bears important consequences for the holders of any patent
that is “essential”3 to a relevant standard (“standard-essential patent” [“SEP”]):
SEP holders are entitled to demand royalties to any so called “standard implemen-
ter” each and every time that standard is practiced. Effectively, SSOs confer SEP
holders a position of monopoly in technology implementing the relevant standard.
To mitigate concerns associated with this monopoly, however, SSOs adopt speciﬁc
rules that are aimed to prevent SEP holders from abusing such privileged pos-
itions, for example by extracting excessive royalties from implementers who
have made speciﬁc investments relying on the standard (a situation that has
become known as “patent holdup”).4 These rules, deﬁning the procedures that
must be followed in relation to identiﬁcation and licensing of SEPs, constitute a
fundamental part of an SSO’s intellectual property rights (IPR) policy, and
1Standards are deﬁned as “voluntary technical speciﬁcations for products, production pro-
cesses, or services”. See Regulation (EU) No 1025/2012 of 25 October 2012 on European
standardization [2012] OJ L 316/12, Rec (1).
2For early literature providing a comprehensive overview of these challenges, see James J
Anton and Dennis A Yao, ‘Standard Setting Consortia, Antitrust, and High-Technology
Industries’ (1995) 64 (1) Antitrust Law Journal 247; Sean P. Gates, ‘Standards, Innovation,
and Antitrust: Integrating Innovation Concerns into the Analysis of Collaborative Standard
Setting’ (1998) 47 Emory Law Journal 584; Mark A Lemley, ‘Intellectual Property Rights
and Standard-Setting Organizations’ (2002) 90 (6) California Law Review 1889; Carl
Shapiro, ‘Setting Compatibility Standards: Cooperation or Collusion?’ in Rochelle Drey-
fuss, Diane L Zimmemann and Harry First (eds.) Expanding the Boundaries of Intellectual
Property: Innovation Policy for the Knowledge Society (Oxford University Press, 2001),
82; David J. Teece and Edward F. Sherry, ‘Standards Setting and Antitrust’ (2003) 87 Min-
nesota Law Review 1913.
3The concept of “essentiality” depends on the SSO in question, and may refer not only to
technical, but also commercial essentiality – ie that non-infringing alternatives may exist but
are too expensive or cumbersome to be worth bringing to the market. According to the
survey conducted for the joint study of the National Academy of Science and the United
States Patent and Trademark Ofﬁce, two SSOs in the ICT sector (IEEE and VITA)
include commercial essentiality within their IPR policies regarding disclosure and licensing
commitments, and one SSO (ETSI) explicitly rules it out. See Keith Maskus and Stephen
A. Merrill, Patent Challenges for Standard-Setting in the Global Economy: Lessons from
Information and Communication Technology (National Academy Press 2013) 38.
4See for example IEEE’s lawyer Michael Lindsay’s characterization of the entire patent
policy as “intended to prevent the risk of ‘patent holdup’ (as well as ‘patent stacking’)”.
See Michael A. Lindsay, Letter to Assistant Attorney General William J. Baer, 7 November
2014. Not currently available on the IEEE’s website, but on ﬁle with the authors.
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certainly a crucial element of consideration for both patent owners and potential
implementers wishing to join an SSO working group.5
Unsurprisingly, given the importance of maintaining a balanced relationship
between these two categories, SSOs’ IPR policies have been a controversial
subject in academic studies on the governance of standard-setting.6 On the one
hand, insufﬁcient guarantees against unreasonable requests by SEP holders may
prevent the emergence of innovative technologies utilizing the standard for fear
of technology users to be “trapped” into onerous licensing schemes. On the
other, excessive interference with the exclusive rights of SEP holders may
lessen their incentives to engage in standard-setting, or to invest in those technol-
ogies in the ﬁrst place. In a nutshell, patent policies of SSOs strive to maximize
standards adoption by balancing the freedom of patent owners to collect royalties
with the need to provide safeguards against possible exploitation of the standard-
ization process.
By far, the most common policy adopted by SSOs in relation to SEPs is one
whereby SEP holders are required to disclose any patents they hold in relation
to the proposed standard, and requested to commit to license those patents
under fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND)7 terms. In principle,
this is a perfect compromise, as it ensures a reasonable return for SEP holders
while preventing them from engaging in opportunistic behaviour.8 However, the
notion of FRAND remains indeterminate, and the process of uncovering its
exact meaning in a particular negotiation frequently falls back into litigation.9
5Benjamin Chiao, Josh Lerner and Jean Tirole, ‘The Rules of Standard Setting Organiz-
ations: an Empirical Analysis’ (2007) 38(4) Rand Journal of Economics 905, 907;
Joanna Tsai, and Joshua Wright, ‘Standard Setting, Intellectual Property Rights, and the
Role of Antitrust in Regulating Incomplete Contracts’ (2015) 80 (1) Antitrust Law
Journal; Rudi Bekkers and Andrew Updegrove, ‘A Study of IPR Policies and Practices
of a Representative Group of Standard Setting Organizations Worldwide’, Presented to
National Academies of Science Symposium onManagement of IP in Standards-Setting Pro-
cesses, Session 4 (3 October 2012) <http://sites.nationalacademies.org/xpedio/groups/
pgasite/documents/webpage/pga_072197.pdf> accessed 8 August 2016.
6Eg Lemley (n 2); Patrick D Curran ‘Standard-Setting Organizations: Patents, Price Fixing,
and Per Se Legality’ (2003) 70(3) The University of Chicago Law Review 983; Kraig A
Jakobsen, ‘Revisiting Standard-Setting Organizations’ Patent Policies’ (2004) 3(1) North-
western Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property 43.
7FRAND is used here as shorthand of the two different nomenclature used in United States
(RAND) and Europe (FRAND) to refer to the same concept. For purposes of this article, the
two terms are interchangeable.
8Richard A. Epstein, F. Scott Kieff and Daniel F. Spulber, ‘The FTC, IP, and SSOs: Gov-
ernment Hold-Up Replacing Private Coordination’ (2012) 8 Journal of Competition Law
and Economics 1.
9It should be mentioned that several factors might concur in driving patent litigation
(including for example the quality and ownership of a patent), such that the relationship
between SEPs and patent litigation is not necessarily binary. For example, a study by
Kirti Gupta and Mark Snyder focusing on US smartphone litigation between 2001 and
2013 shows that quality is a more important determinant of patent litigation than the relation
European Competition Journal 197
To minimize uncertainty and maximize the adoption and use of their standards,
some SSOs have throughout the years altered their internal rules (and in particular
their Patent Policy) addressing concerns expressed by their members, or more gen-
erally by antitrust authorities, about the enforcement of SEPs. One of such recent
changes is the Policy Update of the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engin-
eers (“IEEE”) Standardization Association (altogether, “IEEE-SA”).10 This Policy
Update was meant to address the challenges arising from the vagueness of
FRAND commitments,11 facilitating negotiations between technology owners
and implementers. However, despite the favourable view expressed by the US
Department of Justice (“DoJ”) in a Business Review Letter.12 the revised Policy
has been subject to much critique, both for its substantive amendments and the
controversial process that led to its revision.13
of the patent to a standard. Nevertheless, the data of that research (obtained from the case
pleadings) indicates that about 1/3 of the patents asserted in litigated cases relates to SEPs,
with another third being non-SEP and the remaining third not being identiﬁable as any of
the two. See Kirti Gupta and Mark Snyder, ‘Smart Phone Litigation and Standard Essential
Patents’ (May 2014) Hoover IP² Working Paper Series No 14006 <http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2492331> accessed 8 August 2016, 10.
10The IEEE IPR Policy is codiﬁed in Article 6.2 of the IEEE Standards Association’s
(IEEE-SA) Standards Board Bylaws (December 2015), <http://standards.ieee.org/
develop/policies/bylaws/sb_bylaws.pdf> accessed 5 August 2016.
11See the IEEE Request for Business Review letter (September 2014), retrieved from
<https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/ﬁles/atr/legacy/2015/02/17/311483.pdf>, 11–12.
Clariﬁcation of the meaning of FRAND had also been encouraged by the International Tel-
ecommunication Union, regulators in the EU and US and retail companies alleging to have
been involved in disputes for disproportionate royalty requests in relation to the use of a
standard. See Konstantinos Karachalios, ‘Fundamental Uncertainty at the Intersection
between Patents and Standards’ (November/December 2015) The Patent Lawyer, 33.
12Business Review Letter to the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (2 Febru-
ary 2015) <http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/busreview/311470.htm>. Business Review
Requests are requests submitted to the US Department of Justice by any person concerned
about the legality under US antitrust law of a proposed business conduct. A request results
in a (non-binding) statement (the Business Review Letter) of the Department of Justice’s
current enforcement intentions with respect to that conduct pursuant to the Department’s
Business Review Procedure. See 28 C.F.R. Section 50.6.
13See eg Gregory J Sidak, ‘The Antitrust Division’s Devaluation of Standard-Essential
Patents’, 104 Georgetown Law Journal Online 48 (2015); Nicolas Petit, ‘The IEEE-SA
Revised Patent Policy and Its Deﬁnition of ’Reasonable’ Rates: A Transatlantic Antitrust
Divide?’ (forthcoming, 2016) Fordham Intellectual Property, Media & Entertainment
Law Journal, Vol. XXVII <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2742492> accessed 8 August 2016;
David Teece, ‘Are the IEEE Proposed Changes to IPR Policy Innovation Friendly?’
(2015) Tusher Center for the Management of Intellectual Capital Working Paper No 2
<http://innovation-archives.berkeley.edu/businessinnovation/documents/Teece-Paper-
IEEE-Changes-to-IPR-February-2015.pdf> accessed 10 August 2016; Roy Hofﬁnger, ‘The
2015 DOJ IEEE Business Review Letter: The Triumph of Industrial Policy Preferences
Over Law and Evidence’ (March 2015) 2 CPI Antitrust Chronicle; Stuart M. Chemtob,
‘Carte Blanche for SSOs? The Antitrust Division’s Business Review Letter on the
IEEE’s Patent Policy Update’ (March 2015) 2 CPI Antitrust Chronicle; Ron Katznelson,
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This paper reviews both the substance and process of the Policy Update, and
seeks to examine how it squares with the EU competition law framework. Section
2 discusses the function of SSOs’ IPR Policies and the controversies they have
generated within EU competition law. Section 3 then introduces the reader to
the governance and structure of the IEEE, with particular focus on the IEEE-
SA. Section 4 discusses the speciﬁc modiﬁcations of the Patent Policy brought
by the Policy Update and the process that led to its adoption. Finally, Section 5
discusses the possible application of EU competition law to the standardization
agreements based on the application of the Policy; and Section 6 draws some
conclusions.
2. The challenge of SSOs’ IPR policies: functions and scrutiny
2.1. The role of IPR policies in SSOs
Disputes over the scope and purpose of the rules of engagement for members of an
association are far from uncommon in antitrust law.14 But disputes concerning the
IPR policy of SSOs are somewhat different. Despite having as raison d’etre the
joint pursuit of a common goal, SSOs differ in nature and purpose from pro-
fessional or trade associations. In those associations, members typically share in
the burdens and beneﬁts generated by the common rules: they all form part of
one broad and relatively uniform category, whose interest are consistently
pursued in the activities of the association. In SSOs involving patented technology,
‘Perilous Deviations from FRANDHarmony –Operational Pitfalls of the 2015 IEEE Patent
Policy’, Proceedings of the IEEE SIIT 2015, 9th International Conference on Standardiz-
ation and Innovation in Information Technology, Sunnyvale, October 2015, 2; Don
Clark, ‘Patent Holders Fear Weaker Tech Role: Engineering Group’s Policy Revisions
Could Cut License Fees’ The Wall Street Journal (New York, 8 February 2015); Adam
Missoff, ‘Reality Check: Weakening wireless technology patents hurts everyone’ RCRWir-
elessNews (January 28, 2015) <http://www.rcrwireless.com/20150128/network-
infrastructure/wi-ﬁ/reality-check-weakening-wireless-technology-patents-hurts-everyone-
tag10> accessed 10 August 2016; Brian Pomper, ‘DOJ should not approve IEEE patent
policy weakening WiFi patents’, IPWatchdog (February 2, 2015) <http://www.
ipwatchdog.com/2015/02/02/doj-ieee-policy-wiﬁ-patents/id=54419/> accessed 10 August
2016; Gregory J Sidak, ‘Testing for Bias to Suppress Royalties for Standard-Essential
Patents’ 1 The Criterion Journal on Innovation 301 (2016).
14Within the European Union, see eg EPI code of conduct (Case IV/36.147), Commission
Decision 1999/267/EEC [1999] O.J. L106/14; Case T-144/99 Institute of Professional
Representatives [2001] ECR. II-1087; Case C-309/99 Wouters [2002] ECR. I-1577;
Belgian Architects (Case COMP/A.38549) Commission Decision 2005/8 [2004] O.J. L4/
10; Case C-439/09, Pierre Fabre Dermo-Cosmetique [2011] I-09419; Case T-193/02,
Laurent Piau [2005] ECR II-00209. See also Commission Report on Competition in the
Professional Services, COM(2004)83 ﬁnal of 9 February 2004 <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/
legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:52004DC0083> accessed 8 August 2016;. Edith
Loozen, ‘Professional ethics and restraints of competition’ (2006) 31 European Law
Review, 28-47.
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the common goal (deﬁnition and adoption of standards) operates at a more abstract
level, while tensions arise with regard to its implications for the diverging interests
of SSO participants. In particular, the prospect of selection of a particular technol-
ogy for inclusion in a standard triggers a division into two categories – SEP
holders and technology users – striving for the protection of their interests
within the SSO. Before selection, the main aim for companies holding relevant
patents will be to ensure that the SSO deﬁnes a framework enabling enforcement
of such patents; while the goal for technology users will be to secure access to
those patents, which in turn facilitates adoption of the standard. The same conﬂict
materializes concretely in licensing negotiations taking place after selection: tech-
nology owners holding an SEP will tend to demand implementers royalties corre-
sponding to the market value of that patent; while technology users will seek to
limit the extent to which such value reﬂects the market boost received as a
result of the SEP status.15
This tension is inherent in SSOs as they constitute simultaneously an associ-
ation of sellers and buyers of technology which, often protected in the form of
intellectual property, ends up being part of a standard. Each SSO faces the chal-
lenge of catering both to the interests of companies whose business model is
centred around licensing their own technology for others to build upon, and
those of companies who do not have relevant patents, and whose business
model is predominantly about making incremental changes to the existing para-
digm.16 A patent policy thus serves a two-folded function: on the one hand, attract-
ing technology owners to participate in standardization by ensuring a fair return on
investment for SEP holders, and maintaining their obligations reasonable and pro-
portionate (“incentivizing function”); on the other hand, deﬁning sufﬁcient safe-
guards to limit the ability of SEP holders to exploit their privileged position
(“prophylactic function”).17 As illustrated below through the record of scrutiny
15This conﬂict between negotiating parties goes beyond SSO members, as any ﬁrm making
use of the standard ﬁnds itself in the position of technology implementer. SSO rules there-
fore aim to cast a broader net, which extends FRAND entitlement to any third parties imple-
menting the standard, precisely to constrain the ability of SEP holders to the abuse the
market power that is bestowed upon them as a result of the standardization process.
16Technically there is also a third type of companies, those that own relevant technology
and are vertically integrated into the manufacturing and selling of standards-compliant pro-
ducts. Although these companies have mixed incentives in the standard-setting process,
when it comes to licensing they can be subsumed under the two existing categories: at
any time, they act either as seller or as buyer for a particular patented technology included
in a standard.
17It is worth noting that these prophylactic rules are independent from, and possibly unre-
lated to, the antitrust liability of SEP holders. SSOs rules limiting patentees behavior may
thus go beyond the requirements of antitrust laws, effectively imposing “antitrust plus” obli-
gations on patent holders as a matter of IP policy. An obvious example is the rule prescrib-
ing that SEP holders will be requested to submit a commitment to license their SEPs on
FRAND terms, regardless of the existence of a dominant position in the relevant antitrust
market.
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of SSOs’ patent policies under EU competition law, the pursuit of the prophylactic
function risks shifting bargaining power from technology owners to technology
users, raising concerns about the latter’s exploitation of SSOs as a vehicle to
reach anticompetitive outcomes.
2.2. EU competition law v IPR policies of SSOs: lessons from the ETSI
experience
The ﬁrst manifestation of competitive concern with an SSO’s IPR policy in EU
arose in the context of the proposed IPR Policy and Undertaking (hereinafter
“Undertaking”) of the European Telecommunications Standardisation Institute
(ETSI), approved by its General Assembly in March 1993.18 The proposed Under-
taking required members to license any essential IPR to other ETSI members on
FRAND terms, with the exception of those IPRs for which such licences were
withheld within 180 days after the Technical Assembly put the relevant standard
in the work programme.19 This framework, which implied also the disclosure of a
maximum royalty rate for licensed IPRs, had been preliminarily adopted by ETSI
pending a request to the European Commission for exemption from the application
of article 86 (1) of the Treaty (currently 101 (1) TFEU) pursuant to article 86 (3)
(currently 101 (3)).
The proposal generated widespread criticism and multiple threats of withdra-
wal from ETSI, particularly from important IPR owners.20 Ultimately, the process
grounded to a halt when, in a letter to ETSI and the complainant CBEMA (the
Computer and Business Equipment Manufacturers Association), the Commission
expressed its adversity to the grant of an exemption for the “licensing-by-default”
system envisaged in the Undertaking.21 In particular, the Commission took issue
with the lack of precise information over the technological content of standards
before the public enquiry stage, which would make it technically unfeasible for
IPR owners to identify and withhold IPRs.22 Without awaiting the ﬁnal
18ETSI/GA15 TD 25.
19See Rudi Bekker and Isabelle Liottard, ‘European Standards for Mobile Communications:
The Tense Relationship Between Standards and Intellectual Property Rights’ (1999) 21
European Intellectual Property Review 110.
20For a more comprehensive description, see Roger G. Brooks and Damien Geradin,
‘Taking Contracts Seriously: The Meaning of the Voluntary commitment to license essential
patents on ‘Fair and Reasonable’ terms’, in Steven Anderman and Ariel Ezrachi (eds.) Intel-
lectual Property and Competition Law: new frontiers (Oxford Univ. Press 2011) 389, 398–
99; Eric J. Iversen, ‘Standardization and Intellectual Property Rights: ETSI’s controversial
search for new IPR-procedures’, in Kai Jakobs and Robin Williams (eds) Standardisation
and Innovation in Information Technology. Proc 1st Int. Conf. on Standardisation and Inno-
vation in Information Technology, SIIT ’99, Aachen, IEEE, ISBN 0-7803-9935-8, 1999.
21See Maurits Dolmans, ‘Standards for Standards’ (2002) 26 (1) Fordham International
Law Journal, 163, 181.
22ibid.
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outcome of the exemption procedure, ETSI decided to abandon the Undertaking23
and adopted a revised IPR policy, approved by its General Assembly in November
1994. The fundamental modiﬁcation of that policy was that members would be
required to disclose in good faith the existence of any essential IPRs, including
any potential future IPRs and IPRs held by third parties.24 Disclosure would
then trigger a request by the Director of ETSI to the SEP owner in order to
license that IP on FRAND terms. In case of denial of such request, and where
no alternative was available for the particular standard, ETSI director would
request re-consideration of the denial, and should that be unsuccessful, pass the
patent owner’s explanation on to the European Commission to see what further
action might be appropriate.25
Following the European Commission’s prompt, ETSI had thus revised its IPR
policy restoring the freedom of members to determine whether and how they
would license SEPs. Since the interference with patent holders’ freedom to
license and incentive to develop new technologies was a pivotal consideration
in the Commission’s objection to the Undertaking,26 the approval of the revised
policy by the Commission came as no surprise.27 Crucially, the new mechanism
demonstrated being more proportionate to address the potential issue of patent
holdup, by limiting ETSI members’ burden of disclosure to SEPs of which they
have good faith awareness, whilst also expanding the reach of the enquiry to
SEPs held by third parties.
A few years later, in the context of the Sun antitrust investigation,28 ETSI’s
IPR policy ended up again being subject to the European Commission’s scrutiny.
The European Commission was concerned that Sun had erected an artiﬁcial barrier
to entry in the market for Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM)
smart cards as a result of: (i) the late disclosure and identiﬁcation of claimed essen-
tial IPR in the standard; and (ii) the apparent non-essentiality of the claimed essen-
tial IPR.29 Over the course of the investigation (lasting from 2000 to 2005), the
Commission speciﬁcally requested ETSI to inform standard users that the
claimed essentiality of Sun’s IPRs concerning standard GSM 03.19 (TS 101
23This decision was taken with a vote of the General Assembly on 22 July 1994. See ETSI/
GA20 (94) 20; ETSI/GA20 (94)22Rev 1.
24These SEPs include those which are or are likely to become essential in respect of the
work of the Technical Body. See ETSI Rules of Procedure, Amnex 6: IPR Policy,
section 4; and ETSI Guide on IPRs, 19 September 2013, sec 2.3.3.
25This is still the case in the current iteration of ETSI’s IPR policy: see ETSI Rules of Pro-
cedure, Amnex 6: ETSI Intellectual Property Rights Policy (20 March 2013), sec 6.1 and
14.
26Dolmans (n 21) 181.
27Notice pursuant to Article 19 (3) of Council Regulation No 17 (’) concerning case No IV/
35.006 – ETSI interim IPR policy. OJ No C 76/5 of 28.3.95.
28Sun/ETSI (DG IV case 37926) with regards to the ETSI GSM 03.19 standard.
29Written Question E-0553/03 by Joan Vallvé (ELDR) to the Commission. Breach of EC’s
competition rules. OJ C 51E, 26.2.2004, p 32.
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476) was being questioned.30 Responding to a written enquiry, Commissioner for
Competition Policy Mario Monti expressed the Commission’s desire that SSOs
develop internal rules adequate to prevent the creation of situations of artiﬁcial
barriers to entry through misleading declarations of IPRs in the standard-setting
process (so called “patent ambush”). Commissioner Monti also commented on
the need for a revised IPR policy of ETSI in this regard, which subsequently
became the object of a separate investigation. Eventually, ETSI’s 46th General
Assembly approved in November 2005 a series of changes that strengthened dis-
closure obligations,31 in particular revising the language of the IPR Policy to
reﬂect a general obligation to undertake a “reasonable endeavour” in identifying
and declaring essential IPRs, not only in cases of speciﬁc “awareness” during par-
ticipation in the development of a standard or technical speciﬁcation.32 Measures
taken at the General Assembly included the clariﬁcations in ETSI’s Guide to IPRs
that members with IPR portfolio should adopt procedures to ensure that its partici-
pants are aware of any SEPs in the portfolio,33 and that SEP holders are allowed to
disclose the most restrictive licensing terms.34 Furthermore, a working group was
formed to examine the possibility to introduce ex ante licensing (ie where royalties
are set or discussed before a standard is agreed).35 Satisﬁed with those measures,
the Commission closed the investigation situating itself at the opposite end of the
spectrum than during its ﬁrst ETSI’s IPR policy in 1995: less sceptical and con-
cerned of the adoption of private regulatory measures, more preoccupied that
such measures be sufﬁciently robust to constrain the behaviour of patent
owners. Figure 1 illustrates the interaction between the two different scenarios:
30See “European Commission Precedent to require ETSI to remove from their IPR declara-
tions database an IPR holder’s claim of essential IPR for an ETSI standard”. <http://www.
gtwassociates.com/answers/CommissionETSI.html> accessed 1 August 2016.
31At the same time, the Policy makes clear that this will not imply the obligations for ETSI
members to conduct IPR searches, as recognized by section 4.2 of the IPR Policy. See ETSI
Guide on IPRs <http://www.etsi.org/images/ﬁles/IPR/etsi-guide-on-ipr.pdf> 19 September
2013, sec 6.1–6.3.
32ETSI Guide on IPRs, sec 4.6.2.2 and 4.6.2.3; Bekkers and Updegrove, ‘A Study of IPR
Policies’ (n 17), Supplement 3: Analysis of the IPR Policy of ETSI, p 8.
33See ETSI Guide on IPRs, s 2.1.1.
34ibid sec 4.1.
35European Commission, ‘Competition: Commission welcomes changes in ETSI IPR rules
to prevent ‘patent ambush’’. Press Release 12 December 2005. <http://europa.eu/rapid/
press-release_IP-05-1565_en.htm> accessed 9 August 2016. The working group made
several proposals, including the ex ante determination of a cap of the royalty payable by
an implementer of a particular ETSI standard, but ETSI eventually adopted in 2007 the
current policy of voluntary ex ante disclosure of licensing terms. See ETSI, ‘Ex Ante Dis-
closures of Licensing Terms’ <http://www.etsi.org/about/how-we-work/intellectual-
property-rights-iprs/ex-ante-disclosures> accessed 9 August 2016; and Jorge
L. Contreras, ‘An Empirical Study of the Effects of Ex Ante Licensing Disclosure Policies
on the Development of Voluntary Technical Standards’ (June 2011) National Institute of
Standards and Technology, No. GCR 11-934, 12–13.
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the more a patent policy privileges the incentivizing over the prophylactic func-
tion, the more the SSO is prone to a patent holdup scenario (left side in the
graph). The existence of such scenario may well implicate the responsibility of
the SSO, as the Commission seemed to imply in the Sun/ETSI investigation.36
As the SSO takes steps to actively minimize the risk of holdup, however, the pen-
dulum begins moving towards a different area of concern for antitrust (right side of
the graph): coordination amongst buyers, ie standard implementers.
This swinging of the pendulum between two conﬂicting SSO approaches to
patent policy is a direct consequence of the tension between two different goals
of competition policy pursued in this realm: on the one hand, limiting the possi-
bility to use SSOs as a vehicle of collusion; on the other hand, preventing the
risk that individual SEP owners take advantage of insufﬁcient clarity in the exist-
ing procedures to exploit their advantageous position to the detriment of their
Figure 1. Shifting anticompetitive concerns with SSOs’ patent policies.
36Sun/ETSI (n 26). See also Ruben Schellingerhout, ‘Standard setting from a competition
law perspective’ (2011) 1 Competition Policy Newsletter 4. <http://ec.europa.eu/
competition/publications/cpn/2011_1_1_en.pdf> accessed 10 August 2010. For a similar
ﬁnding in United States, see Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v Indian Head, Inc., 486
U.S. 492 (1988), 500, 509.
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customers and consumers. To pursue the two goals simultaneously, SSOs must
remain within reasonable limits when adopting regulatory measures to address
these concerns. As illustrated in the following sections, the preventative measures
recently adopted by the IEEE dangerously shift the pendulum into a zone of poten-
tial collusion, exposing future IEEE standards to possible antitrust challenges.
Before making a substantive analysis of those challenges, however, it is important
to understand the way in which standard setting is inﬂuenced by the governance
structure and the relevant procedures of the IEEE-SA.
3. Structure and governance of the IEEE-SA
The IEEE, a privately-driven organization incorporated under US law, is one of the
largest technical professional societies. With around 450,000 members from
nearly 160 countries, the IEEE is engaged in various branches of modern engin-
eering and ICT industry. According to its mission statement, the activities of the
Institute are predominantly aimed at fostering innovation and contributing to the
global technical progress.37 The Institute serves as an overarching organization
for a large number of societies, boards and committees, including its Standardiz-
ation Association (IEEE-SA).
A considerable number of standards for wireless telecommunications were
developed under coordination of the IEEE-SA platform. For instance, standardiz-
ation of the bottom two layers of the ISO/OIS protocol stack led to formation of
IEEE 802.15.438 and subsequently, the ZigBee technical speciﬁcation, which
allowed low-cost and low-speed data transfer between devices. This short-range
communication system intends to provide applications with relaxed throughput
and latency requirements in WPAN, and is commonly used in trafﬁc management
systems and electrical meters with in-home displays.39 Similarly, the set of speci-
ﬁcations for Wi-Fi chipsets,40 also referred to as the IEEE 802.11WLAN standard,
enables the interconnection of electronics technologized via wireless telecommu-
nications. Like a number of other fundamental IEEE technical speciﬁcations, the
mentioned standards are subject to industry-wide commitment and proved to be
almost indispensable in modern reality. IEEE’s standard development activity is
37IEEE Constitution and Bylaws 2016 (June 2016) (“IEEE Bylaws”) <http://www.ieee.org/
documents/ieee_constitution_and_bylaws.pdf> accessed 26 July 2016, Article 1; IEEE
Mission and Vision, Mission Statement <http://www.ieee.org/about/vision_mission.html>
accessed 26 July 2016.
38Chiara Buratti and others, ‘An Overview on Wireless Sensor Networks Technology and
Evolution’ (2009) 9(9) Sensors (Basel) 6869.
39See the ofﬁcial website of ZigBee Alliance <http://www.zigbee.org/> accessed 27 July
2016.
40See the ofﬁcial website of the Working Group for WLAN Standards <http://www.
ieee802.org/11/> accessed 26 July 2016.
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accredited by the American National Standards Institute (ANSI),41 which implies
that standards developed within its forum enjoy a certain degree of authority at
both national and international levels.42
Being a specialized organizational unit (“Major Board”)43 of the Institute, the
IEEE-SA has its own governance system and a high degree of authority over
matters related to standardization.44 Chaired by a President, who acts as a
contact point for external stakeholders,45 the IEEE-SA is governed by its own
Board of Governors (BOG) that in turn establishes the Association’s policies
and delivers ﬁnancial oversight of the Association’s activities to the IEEE’s
highest hierarchical authority, the Board of Directors.46 A maximum of 15 BOG
members is elected every two years by IEEE voting members who also hold mem-
bership of the IEEE-SA.47
Each year, the BOG appoints the Standards Board (SASB) amongst the voting
members of both IEEE-SA and IEEE.48 The SASB plays an important role in the
processes of development and approval of IEEE draft standards, and divides its
activities between different SASB standing committees. For instance, the Patent
Committee (PatCom) reviews standard-setting processes with regard to the use
41See the list of ANSI Accredited Standards Developers (22 June 2016) <https://share.ansi.
org/Shared%20Documents/Standards%20Activities/American%20National%20Standards/
ANSI%20Accredited%20Standards%20Developers/JUNE16ASD_basic.pdf> accessed 26
July 2016. The ANSI accreditation grants SSOs a status of American Standards Developer.
Importantly, an SSO should re-apply for accreditation after signiﬁcant modiﬁcation of its
standards development procedures. See American National Standards Institute, Consti-
tution and By-Laws (2015) <https://share.ansi.org/shared%20documents/About%
20ANSI/Governance/ANSI_Constitution_and_ByLaws_2015.pdf> accessed 14 August
2916, Section 6.10.
42Standards crafted by the ANSI-accredited SSOs are classiﬁed as American National Stan-
dards (ANS). These are the standards typically referenced in US legislation pursuant to the
US National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995 (NTTAA), which requires
governmental agencies to use technical standard developed by voluntary consensus SSOs as
means to reach their policy objectives. See Public Law 103–13, 110 STAT. 775 (1996) Sec
11 (4) (5) and 12(d) (1). See also “American National Standard, value of the ANS desig-
nation” <https://share.ansi.org/shared%20documents/News%20and%20Publications/
Brochures/Value%20of%20the%20ANS.pdf> accessed 5 August 2016. Losing ANSI’s
accreditation (for instance, as a consequence of departure of modiﬁed standards develop-
ment procedures from the due process requirement) can severely harm an SSO’s inter-
national reputation, limiting its contribution to global standard-setting and the
development of national standard-related policies.
43IEEE Bylaws, I-303 Sec 2.
44IEEE Bylaws, I-303 Sec 6.
45IEEE-SA Operations Manual (May 2016) <https://standards.ieee.org/develop/policies/
sa_opman/sa_om.pdf> accessed 26 July 2016, Article 4.2.2.1.
46IEEE Bylaws, I-303 Sec.6. The Board of Directors is the governing body of the IEEE; as
it currently stands, the Board of Directors is composed of individuals elected by the IEEE
Assembly and voting members. See IEEE Constitution, Article IX Sec 1 and 2.
47ibid.
48IEEE-SA Operations Manual, Article 5.1.2.
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of patented technologies.49 PatCom is also responsible for deﬁning the Institute’s
IPR Policy, although its contributions take the form of non-binding recommen-
dations to the SASB. Modiﬁcations in the IEEE-SA’s bylaws (including in the
IPR Policy) involve participation of the other committee of SASB, namely
the Procedures Committee (ProCom), also appointed by the SASB.50 However,
the engagement of the ProCom in the processes of alteration the IEEE-SA’s
bylaws is not obligatory51: for instance, the process for the Patent Policy
Update in 2007 happened entirely within the PatCom.52
In order to ensure that IEEE-SA standard-setting activity respects minimum
procedural safeguards, a set of speciﬁc rules is deﬁned within its regulatory frame-
work. Each of the IEEE-SA standards development stages, namely the proposal to
standardize; the deﬁnition of technical conditions and requirements to be included
in the perspective standard; and the approval of a standard’s draft,53 should be
guided by the principles of due process, openness, consensus, balance, and the
right of appeal.54
Similar principles are promoted by the US Standards Development Organiz-
ation Advancement Act of 2004 (SDOAA):55 in order to beneﬁt from “rule of
reason” treatment,56 SSOs are required inter alia, to provide stakeholders access
to information, to offer them opportunities to participate and express their position
in standardization activities, and to prevent domination by a single interest
group.57 Finally, meetings and discussions within the IEEE-SA are guided by
49IEEE-SA Standards Board Bylaws Article 4.2.5; this Committee is composed of at least
four but not more than six persons, who must be voting members of the SASB or the BOG.
50IEEE-SA Standards Board Bylaws, Article 4.2.1.
51IEEE-SA Standards Board Bylaws, Article 8 states that “proposed modiﬁcations to these
bylaws may be submitted to the IEEE-SA ProCom for its consideration “… (emphasis
added)
52See the Request for Business Review Letter (n 11) 3–4.
53This division of standards development stages is rather simpliﬁed, as each of the three
stages is typically comprised out of more phases.
54Standards Board Bylaws, Article 2.1 IEEE-SA, IEEE-SA Standards Board Operations
Manual (December 2015) <http://standards.ieee.org/develop/policies/opman/sb_om.pdf>
accessed 26 July 2016, Article 5.3.3, IEEE-SA Operations Manual, Article 1.2.
55Standards Development Organization Advancement Act of 2004 (2004), Public Law 108
– 237, 188 Stat. 661 (2002) Sec 101 (5). The term ‘Standards Development Organization’
(or “SDO”) is equivalent to “Standard-Setting Organization” (or “SSO”), more commonly
used in the United States.
5615 U.S. Code § 4302 and SDOAA 2004, Sec 104 (2).
57SDOAA 2004, Sec 102 (5); The SDOAA amends the text of the National Cooperative
Research and Production Act of 1993 to, among other things, extend to SSO the more
lenient treatment of joint venture under antitrust law: see 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301–06. In particu-
lar, the amendment provides that “the conduct of […] a standards development organization
while engaged in a standards development activity […] shall not be deemed illegal per se;
such conduct shall be judged on the basis of its reasonableness, taking into account all rel-
evant factors affecting competition, including, but not limited to, effects on competition in
properly deﬁned, relevant research, development, product, process, and service markets”.
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the Association’s Antitrust and Competition Policy58 and subject to the Robert’s
Rules of Order (RORN),59 which deﬁnes procedures applicable to meetings,
debates and balloting in organizations and assemblies.
Compliance with the aforementioned rules and principles, together with the
largely overlapping requirements imposed by ANSI60 and the principles for the
development of international standards of the WTO,61 ensures that standards
crafted as a result of those standards development processes do not constitute
manipulation and result in a barrier to trade and development. The consistency
of this framework would be undermined by an interpretation, explained in
Section 4.2 below, according to which such principles do not apply to the devel-
opment of policies (such as the Patent Policy Update) which are pertinent to the
IEEE’s standard-setting activities.
4. IEEE-SA’s patent policy update
4.1. Changes introduced by the policy update
While IEEE-SA’s Patent Policy had always been based on ex ante disclosure of
SEPs and FRAND commitments (through the submission of apposite Letters of
Assurance), in 2007 the organization reported suboptimal results in the utilization
of these mechanisms to avoid disputes over licensing terms. In particular, it ident-
iﬁed two difﬁculties in relying on SEP owners’ FRAND commitments: the vague-
ness of those commitments, which could lead to extensive litigation delaying the
entry of new products; and the prohibition of any discussion of licensing terms
58IEEE SA Antitrust and Competition policy, last updated on 24 August 2010, <http://
standards.ieee.org/develop/policies/antitrust.pdf> accessed 9 August 2016. The policy pro-
vides practical, yet non-binding, guidelines to avert the possibility of anticompetitive
agreements.
59Robert’s Rules of Order Newly Revised, 11th ed (Da Capo Press, 2011).
60ANSI Essential Requirements: Due Process Requirements for American National Stan-
dards (January 2016) www.ansi.org/essentialrequirements accessed 26 July 2016. Being
an ANSI-accredited standards developer (ASD), the IEEE must ensure that standards devel-
opment procedures of the IEEE-SA meet the ANSI requirements for openness and due
process, and represent the consensus of materially affected and interested stakeholders.
By the same token, ANSI’s acceptance of the Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Code of
Good Practice makes the WTO norms applicable to the ANSI-accredited organizations
(See the List of Standardizing Bodies that have accepted the Code of Good Practice
since 1 January 1995, G/TBT/CS/2/Rev.22 (February 2016)).
61See Decision of the TBT Committee on principles for the development of international
standards, guides and recommendations with relation to Articles 2, 5 and Annex 3 of the
Agreement. G/TBT/1/Rev.7, 28 November 2000, Section IX (referring to the principles
of transparency, openness, impartiality, consensus, coherence, effectiveness and relevance).
Compliance with those principles ultimately triggers a presumption that the resulting stan-
dards do not constitute (potential) barriers to international trade and development (TBT
Agreement, Article 2.4).
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within Working Groups,62 which prevented working group members from making
sensible cost-beneﬁt comparisons and therefore reaching decisions on a consensus
basis.63 To overcome these challenges, the IEEE-SA proposed a modiﬁcation
enabling patent holders to disclose the most restrictive licensing terms (which
may include the maximum licensing rate) of their SEPs, and allowing Working
Group members to discuss the relative costs and beneﬁts of alternative technol-
ogies within technical standard-setting meetings under certain conditions. As
acknowledged by the DoJ in its Business Review Letter, those conditions included
the ability to discuss the costs of licensing the essential patent claims needed to
implement the technologies under consideration, but do not allow joint negotiation
and discussion of speciﬁc licensing terms, as that would lead to coordination
giving rise to possibly anticompetitive effects.64
Conﬁrming its positive assessment of the analogous patent policy update
approved in its VITA Business Review Letter in 2006, the DoJ condoned the pro-
posed modiﬁcations. It also noted that the enactment of these measures may not be
desirable for all SSOs, in particular as voluntary disclosure of most restrictive
licensing terms may lead to a decrease in participation of standard-setting activities
by patent holders.
Despite recent approval and implementation of those modiﬁcations, the DoJ
was soon confronted with another Business Review request for an important
alteration of the IEEE-SA’s patent policy. The alteration was the result of the
work of an ad-hoc group formed to discuss the six propositions65 made by
Deputy Assistant Attorney General Renata Hesse at a roundtable on the effective-
ness of FRAND organized by the International Telecommunication Union on 10
October 2012.66 In its request on 30 September 2014, IEEE-SA’s attorney
explained that practical experience had shown the insufﬁciency of the 2007
62See IEEE Antitrust and Competition Policy (n 56) 4–5.
63IEEE-SA Request for Business Review Letter 2007 <https://www.justice.gov/sites/
default/ﬁles/atr/legacy/2014/01/28/302148.pdf> accessed 15 September 2016, p 5.
64ibid 11.
65The six proposals were the following:
. Put some limitations on the right of the patent holder who has made a FRAND licen-
sing commitment to seek an injunction
. Find ways to lower the transactions cost of determining FRAND licensing terms
. Identify proposed technology that involves patents which the patent holder has not
agreed to license on FRAND terms in advance.
. Make it clear that licensing commitments transfer to subsequent purchasers.
. Allow licensees to request cash-only licensing terms; prohibit the mandatory cross-
licensing of patents that are not essential to the standard or a related family of stan-
dards; and permit voluntary cross-licensing of all patents.
. Increase certainty that patents declared essential are essential to the standard after it is
set.
66Renata Hesse, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Six
‘Small’ Proposals for SSOs Before Lunch, Remarks as Prepared for the ITU-T Patent
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patent policy to deal with the problem of vagueness of FRAND,67 particularly
since the opportunity to disclose the most restrictive licensing terms had only
been used in 2 out of the 40 occasions in which SEP holders submitted a Letter
of Assurance (LOA) committing to license on FRAND terms. He noted that clar-
iﬁcation of the meaning of RAND had been encouraged by regulators in US and
EU, as well as by retail companies alleging to have been involved in disputes for
disproportionate royalty requests in relation to the use of a standard. As a result,
the Business Review Request sought approval of four fundamental changes in
the patent policy:
. First, a clariﬁcation that patent holders are bound by the IEEE RAND Com-
mitment to license their patents for “any Compliant Implementation”,
whereby “Compliant Implementation” is deﬁned as any product (eg com-
ponent, sub-assembly, or end-product) or service that conforms to any man-
datory or optional portion of a normative clause of an IEEE Standard”.68
. Second, a clariﬁcation that a LOA posted on IEEE’s website “signiﬁes that
reasonable terms and conditions, including without compensation or under
Reasonable Rates, are sufﬁcient compensation for a license to use those
Essential Patent Claims” and “precludes seeking, or seeking to enforce, a
[n injunction]69 except as provided in [IEEE-SA’s] policy”.70 The foreseen
exception is when “the implementer fails to participate in, or to comply with
the outcome of, an adjudication, including an afﬁrming ﬁrst-level appellate
review […] by one or more courts that have the authority to: determine
Reasonable Rates and other reasonable terms and conditions; adjudicate
patent validity, enforceability, essentiality, and infringement; award monet-
ary damages; and resolve any defenses and counterclaims”.71
. Third, a clariﬁcation that “Reasonable Rate” means “appropriate compen-
sation to the patent holder for the practice of an Essential Patent Claim
excluding the value, if any, resulting from the inclusion of that […] technol-
ogy in the IEEE standard”.72 In particular, determination of such Reason-
able Rates should include: (a) the value that the functionality of the
Roundtable 13 (10 October 2012) <http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/287855.
pdf>.
67See also Lindsay’s letter to Assistant Attorney General Baer (n 4), citing Christine
Varney’s Six Proposals speech: “Clarity alone does not eliminate the possibility of hold
up… but it is a step in the right direction”.
68IEEE-SA, ‘IEEE-SA Standards Board Bylaws’ (2015) [6.1] (deﬁnition of “compliant
implementation”).
69More speciﬁcally, the policy refers to a Prohibitive Order, which is deﬁned in [6.2] as “an
interim or permanent injunction, exclusion order or similar decision that limits or prevents
making, using or selling a compliant implementation”.
70IEEE-SA, ‘IEEE-SA Standards Board Bylaws’ (2015) [6.2] (emphasis added).
71ibid [6.2].
72ibid [6.1].
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claimed invention or inventive feature within the Essential Patent Claim
contributes to the value of the relevant functionality of the smallest saleable
Compliant Implementation (SSCI) that practices the Essential Patent Claim;
(b) the value that the Essential Patent Claim contributes to the SSCI that
practices that claim, in light of the value contributed by all Essential
Patent Claims for the same IEEE Standard practiced in that Compliant
Implementation; and (c) the existing licences covering use of the Essential
Patent Claim, where such licences were not obtained under the explicit or
implicit threat of a Prohibitive Order, and where the circumstances and
resulting licences are otherwise sufﬁciently comparable to the circumstances
of the contemplated licence.
. Fourth, a clariﬁcation that SEP holders can require reciprocity with regard to
the licensee’s patents that are essential to the same standard, but not with
regard to non-SEPs or patents that are essential to other standards.
In its Business Review Letter, the DoJ expressed the view that these changes
offer the advantage of bringing clarity to the existing framework, thereby facilitat-
ing negotiations between SEP owners and standard implementers. With particular
reference to the exclusion of injunctive relief before ﬁnal adjudication of infringe-
ment, validity or essentiality, the DoJ viewed the provision as unproblematic
because it was not “signiﬁcantly more restrictive than current U.S. law”.73 It
also reasoned that patent owners can always refuse to submit LOAs if they
want to maintain their right to seek injunctive relief. In taking this formalistic
view of what patent owners remain free to do, however, the DoJ failed to acknowl-
edge the reality of negotiations in terms of what patent owners are incentivized to
do, considering the likely exclusion of LOA-free technology from relevant IEEE
standards.74 In a similar fashion, the DoJ downplayed the role of the royalty deter-
mination method, noting that its identiﬁed criteria are merely “recommended”, and
that it remains open to parties’ negotiation over additional elements. Finally, it
observed that the duty to grant licences to any compliant implementation does
not mandate the use of speciﬁc (or the same) licensing terms at different level
of production, and that cross-licensing and portfolio licensing of patents not essen-
tial to the standard can be obtained (but not imposed) through negotiations.
73Business Review Letter (n 12) 10.
74For evidence of the likelihood of this scenario, see the case of the work around the IEEE-
802.11ah standard amendment, the so called “Long Range WLAN at Sub 1 GHz”, narrated
by Katznelson (n 11) 4. In that working group, a design-around solution was proposed to
avoid using the (46) SEPs declared by Qualcomm in standard IEEE-P802.11ah, for
which Qualcomm had failed to submit a Letter of Assurance in line with the revised IP
policy. The working group could not make a compromised solution, and therefore post-
poned discussions about this standard amendment to its next meeting in July 2016. See
<https://mentor.ieee.org/802.11/dcn/15/11-15-0950-00-00ah-july-2015-tgah-closing-
report.pptx> accessed 10 August 2016.
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As a result, the DoJ concluded that any anticompetitive harm in the Policy
Update was not likely, and to the extent that there is such harm, “potential procom-
petitive beneﬁts likely outweigh [it]”.75 It is worth noting however that, while this
statement reﬂects the “rule of reason” type of balancing followed in the United
States for agreements such as those described in the IEEE-SA patent policy,76
an assessment of the same practice under EU competition law would be conducted
under a different analytical framework, possibly leading to conﬂicting results.
Prior to delving into that framework in Section 5, the following subsection
describes the key steps of the process through which the Policy Update came
into being.
4.2. The process leading to the policy update
In order to discuss possible amendments of its Patent Policy, an Ad Hoc committee
(further referred to as Ad Hoc) was appointed by the PatCom during a meeting in
March 2013 (Appendix 1).77 This committee consisted of seven 2013 PatCom
members, an upcoming 2014–2015 PatCom member an upcoming 2014–2015
PatCom non-voting member, one IEEE staff member and two non-voting
members of the 2016 BOG (the secretary and the administrator). In the following
two years, the members of the Ad Hoc committee joined forces to develop the
Policy Update. The Policy was drafted by a subcommittee of the Ad Hoc within
15 months following the meeting of March 2013. Since neither the minutes the
Ad Hoc committee’s meetings, nor those of the subcommittee were publicly avail-
able, the course of the discussions and the rationale behind the decisions taken at
those meetings remain unknown. In the view of the Ad Hoc committee, however,
this accountability gap was ﬁlled by the presentation of reports at the PatCom
meetings and the IEEE-SA Patent Forum.78
After the Ad Hoc’s approval, the draft was opened for an online public review
and commenting. In total, four drafts were available for the public review, 680
comments were made and 547 of them were responded to by the Ad Hoc. The
forth and the last version incorporated some of the suggested modiﬁcations,79
and was approved by the PatCom in June 2014 in a process of simple majority
75ibid 16.
76As noted, rule of reason treatment is granted to SDOs provided that they fulﬁl a number of
requirements. However, the IEEE’s departure from the principles of due process and con-
sensus, as documented in the present section, suggests that IEEE-SA standard-setting
activity under the new Policy would not be eligible for the USDOA safe harbour, calling
for a stricter scrutiny of potentially anticompetitive conduct.
77PatCom Meeting Minutes of 4 March 2013 <http://standards.ieee.org/about/sasb/patcom/
0313mins.pdf> accessed 27 July 2016.
78Request for Review Letter (n 11) 13–15.
79See eg the example brought by Konstantinos Karachalios, ‘Updating the Patent Policy’,
SES Standards Engineering (July-August 2016) 19.
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voting, with favourable vote from three individuals who were also members of the
Ad Hoc committee.80 The negative votes came from the two individuals who were
not part of the committee.81 The Chair,82 who was also the member of the Ad Hoc,
abstained. The draft was subsequently submitted for consideration of the SASB,
which discussed the proposed Policy Update in its open session held in August
2014. After accepting the PatCom report in paper balloting,83 the SASB forwarded
the draft to the BOG for approval,84 which took place in December 2014.85 Sub-
sequently, a ﬁnal approval was sought and obtained from the Board of Directors at
a meeting in February 2014.86
The high approval rate at the BOG and the additional support obtained from
the Board of Directors indicate the attainment of consensus87 and the review by
the democratically elected authority of the IEEE.88 However, it is questionable
whether the deﬁciencies in the processes of policy development and approval at
the lower levels, namely SASB, PatCom and Ad Hoc committee can be adequately
remedied by these measures taken at the highest hierarchical level.
Firstly, as it appears from the composition of the Ad Hoc and the 2014 PatCom,
charged with the crucial decision of accepting the Policy Update, the revised
Policy was not drafted by all interested stakeholders; rather, the process was domi-
nated by major technology users, who systematically defended their own
80Those individuals were afﬁliated with Microsoft, Intel and Apple. See PatCom Meeting
Minutes of 10 June 2014 <http://standards.ieee.org/about/sasb/patcom/0614patmins.pdf>
accessed 27 July 2016.
81Afﬁliated with Alcatel – Lucent and Ericsson.
82Afﬁliated with Hewlett Packard.
83The SASB approved the revised Policy with 14 votes in favour and 5 votes against, IEEE-
SA Standards Board Meeting Minutes of 20–21 August 2014 <http://standards.ieee.org/
about/sasb/0814sasbmin.pdf> accessed 27 July 2016. Unlike the minutes of the PatCom
meetings, the minutes of the SASB meetings do not reveal the identity of individuals
behind every vote. Such form of paper balloting should therefore be considered “secret bal-
loting.” Following the RORN it is typically used “when the question is on such nature that
some members might hesitate to vote publically their true sentiments”, and requires a prior
motion. See RORN (n 59) [30] “Motions Relating to Methods of Voting and the Polls” at
285.
84See IEEE-SA Board of Governors Resolution of December 2014 <https://standards.ieee.
org/about/bog/resolutions.html> accessed 4 August 2016.
85With one BOG member recusing from vote, the draft was approved with nine votes in
favour and three votes against. IEEE Standards Association Board of Governors (BOG)
Meeting Minutes of 5 December 2014, on ﬁle with the authors.
86See Konstantinos Karachalios, ‘Updating the Patent Policy’ (n 79) 18; Rudy Bekkers,
‘Concerns and evidence with ex post holdup’ <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2663939> accessed 8 August 2016.
87The BOG approval rate of 75% (9 out of 12 votes in favour) complies with the require-
ment of “consensus” for standards approval, see IEEE-SA Standards Board Operations
Manual, Article 5.4.3.3 and 5.4.3.5; and Konstantinos Karachalios, ‘Updating the Patent
Policy’ (n 79).
88See n 46.
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commercial interests in favour of certain policy changes.89 Technology owners,
who should have been represented in the Ad Hoc as a counterweight to equipment
manufacturers and vendors, were involved in the process only at its ﬁnal stages.
Their negative votes during the PatCom ballot in June 2014 could not possibly
have made a difference for the outcome, as they were outnumbered by the
members of the Ad Hoc itself.90
Secondly, and relatedly, the Patent Policy drafting process failed to comply
with the IEEE-SA core principle of consensus, which requires a substantial agree-
ment reached between directly and materially affected interest groups91 and
implies a consideration of all diverging views and objections.
Thirdly, it remains questionable whether the provision of the motion for paper
balloting during the SASB meeting entirely followed the procedure prescribed in
the RORN.92 While an action requiring a speciﬁc vote can in principle be taken by
unanimous consent reﬂecting the will of governing body,93 a prior veriﬁcation by
the chair that no member objects as regard the action is necessary for obtaining the
unanimous consent.94 Since the minutes of the SASB meeting are silent as regards
this veriﬁcation by the chair, the compliance of the balloting process with the
RORN cannot be established with certainty.95
Finally, the IEEE-SA appears to have failed to fulﬁl its duty of coordination
with respect to its independent US afﬁliate IEEE USA,96 which speciﬁcally
objected to the Policy Update. In its resolution of 21 November 2014, the
IEEE-USA Board of Directors sought clariﬁcation on the evidence that the
IEEE (-SA) was harmed by the 2007 Policy, the speciﬁc problems addressed by
89Roy E. Hofﬁnger (n 13) 6–7.
90For a further empirical analysis of the process of the development and the adoption of
IEEE-SA Patent Policy Update and the handling of the comments submitted during the
public review, see Sidak, ‘Testing for Bias to Suppress Royalties for Standard-Essential
Patents’ (n 13).
91IEEE-SA Standards Board Bylaws, Article 2.1.
92See SASB meeting minutes of 20–21 August (n 83) item 11.1.
93See IEEE-SA BOG Appeal Ofﬁcers Decision, 22 October 2014, which references
Chapter XIII, Section 45 of the RORN, on ﬁle with the authors.
94See RORN (n 59) [4] “The Handling of a Motion” at 54, stating that “To obtain unani-
mous consent (…) the chair states that “If there is no objection… [or, ‘Without objection
…’]” (…) or he may ask, “Is there any objection to… ?” He then pauses, and if no
members call out (…) the action is decided upon (…)”.
95By the same token, it is unclear whether the statement of no objections has been asked by
the chair during the BOG voting which similar to the SASB occurred via paper balloting;
see (BOG) Meeting Minutes of 5 December 2014 (n 85).
96Much as the IEEE-SA, the IEEE-USA is an organizational unit (’Major Board’) of the
IEEE. Pursuant to I-303 Sec 2 IEEE Bylaws, Major Boards should coordinate programmes
related to the missions of other Major Boards. Since the core activities of the IEEE-USA
include recommending policies intending to serve engineering professionals and general
public of the US ((IEEE Bylaws I-303 Sec 8), it has a considerable interest in policies gov-
erning Institute’s standardization activities.
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the proposed change and the way in which each of the proposed changes contrib-
utes to resolving those problems.97 Despite their signiﬁcance, those questions
were never addressed by the IEEE-SA.98
Despite the above-mentioned issues, the IEEE-SA Patent Policy Update has
survived a series of appeals. In August 2014, the proposed policy amendments
were appealed by the technology owners disadvantaged by the substantive and
procedural aspects of the updated Patent Policy before the BOG.99 This appeal
was rejected by the BOG, which in contrast to the claim of the appellants, con-
sidered the appeal not related to inaction of the SASB and therefore not
timely.100 A second appeal, this time related to the SASB approval of draft
policy modiﬁcations, was ﬁled before the BOG in September 2014,101 but
failed due to the appellants’ failure to establish a prima facie case, and thus
obtain BOG Appeal Panel jurisdiction.102
The subsequent re-accreditation of the IEEE as an Accredited Standard Devel-
oper (ASD)103 was appealed before the ANSI Executive Standards Council
(ExSC) in October 2015, followed by a hearing on 9 February 2016.104 In its
reasoning, the ANSI ExSc Panel determined that the ANSI Essential Require-
ments, compliance with which serves as a basis for ASD accreditation,105 do
97Motion Approved by the IEEE-USA Board of Directors (November 2014), www.ieeeusa.
org/volunteers/committees/IPC/IEEEUSAPatentPolicyMotionNov14.pdf accessed 27 July
2016.
98Ron Katznelson, ‘Perilous Deviations from FRAND Harmony’ (n 13).
99The appellants were Qualcomm Incorporated, Alcatel-Lucent USA Incorporated, Fraun-
hofer-Gesellschaft e.V., InterDigital Incorporated, Nokia Corporation, Nokia Solutions and
Networks Oy, Panasonic Corporation, and SanDisk Corporation. Appelants’ Appeal Brief
of 11 August 2014, on ﬁle with the authors.
100The BOG Appeal Panel stated that the SASB members’ decision to hold a joint meeting
with the PatCom, which initiated the process of policy approval on the top hierarchical
levels of the IEEE-SA and the IEEE, constituted an “action”. Pursuant Section 5.8.3 of
IEEE-SA Standards Board Operations Manual, an action can be appealed within 30 days
following its notiﬁcation, while “inaction” can be appealed within 60 days. The appeal at
issue was ﬁled within 60 days, exceeding the time limit granted by the IEEE-SA regulatory
framework. Furthermore, even if the appeal had been timely, the BOG Appeal Panel con-
sidered the voting on draft policy approval within the SASB as a remedy for the claimed
“inaction”. See IEEE-SA BOG Appeal Ofﬁcers Decision, 18 September 2014, on ﬁle
with the authors.
101Appellants’ Appeal Brief of 18 September 2014, on ﬁle with the authors.
102In brief, the BOG Appeal Panel based its decision on Section 5.4 of the IEEE-SA Stan-
dards Board Bylaws, which provided that appeal can be ﬁled by those adversely affected by
a standard or lack of action in IEEE standardization process (emphasis added). The claims
put forward by the appellants were found not to be related to any of the two conditions. See
IEEE-SA BOG Appeal Ofﬁcers Decision, 22 October 2014, on ﬁle with the authors.
103See n 41.
104The appellants were Alcatel-Lucent, Ericsson and Qualcomm.
105See n 41.
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not apply to the development of standard-setting policies.106 For this reason, the
ExSC Panel rejected the appeal, explaining that SSOs are free to draft their own
policy without necessarily adopting an open and consensus-based process.107
In the authors’ view, if this is in fact the correct scope of application of the
ANSI requirements, there is an important ﬂaw in the (US) governance of SSOs.
In the case of IEEE, more speciﬁcally, the above-mentioned principles are
crucial to fulﬁl its mission ensuring that humanity (and not only a fraction of it)
is beneﬁtted.108 The justiﬁcation that the application of consensus requirement
to policy-making activity would prevent the IEEE-SA from acting in the interests
of the Institution109 sits at odds with the IEEE-SA’s role of a consensus-based
SSO. Given the inseparability of the rules and policies for standards development
from the actual process of standardization, the ANSI and WTO principles should
logically apply not only to standards development processes, but also to the devel-
opment of any policies governing the Institute’s standardization activities. This is
especially the case in a patent-intensive sector, where patent policies are decisive
for any corresponding standardization agreements. Furthermore, the argument that
development of SSOs Patent Policies is inseparable from its standardization activi-
ties is also supported by the SDOAA, which adopts a deﬁnition of “standard devel-
opment activity” explicitly covering any actions taken with respect to an SSO’s
patent policy.110
106ANSI Executive Standards Council, Summary Decision, 25 February 2016, on ﬁle with
authors.
107It is worth noting that the ANSI Intellectual Property Right Policy Committee was asked
to vote on compliance of the proposed IEEE Patent Policy with the ANSI Patent Policy. The
results of this balloting (15 votes in favour of compliance, 10 votes against and 11
abstained) indicate a considerable degree of doubt between the members of the ANSI
IPR Policy Committee. See ANSI Executive Standards Council, Summary Decision.
108IEEE’s ofﬁcial mission is “to foster technological innovation and excellence for the
beneﬁt of humanity”. See IEEE mission statement at <http://www.ieee.org/about/vision_
mission.html> accessed 10 August 2016. For a more detailed elaboration of IEEE’s
purpose, see article I of the IEEE Constitution.
109IEEE-SA Standards Board Bylaws Change Process <http://grouper.ieee.org/groups/pp-
dialog/bylaws_process.html> accessed 27 July 2016. This argument has also been
invoked in the response to the comments on the Patent Policy drafts, for instance IEEE-
SA PatCom – IEEE-SA Standards Board Bylaws First pass report 5th Aug 2013 draft com-
ments of 23 September 2013, IEEE-SA PatCom – IEEE-SA Standards Board Bylaws 4 Mar
2014 draft – Final responses to comments of 10 May 2014 (Draft and Comments Received
<http://grouper.ieee.org/groups/pp-dialog/drafts_comments/> accessed 27 July 2016. at
<http://www.ieee.org/about/vision_mission.html> accessed 10 August 2016.
110Standards Development Organization Advancement Act of 2004 (n 57), Sec 103: “The
term ‘standards development activity’ means any action taken by a SDO for the purpose of
developing, promulgating, revising, amending, reissuing, interpreting, or otherwise main-
taining a voluntary consensus standard, or using such standard in conformity assessment
activities, including actions relating to the intellectual property policies of the standards
development organization” (emphasis added). Yet, this argument was found unpersuasive
by the ANSI ExSC Panel, see summary decision, (n 106).
216 N. Zingales and O. Kanevskaia
5. The new policy under the lens of EU competition law
One of the consequences of lack of consensus and balanced stakeholder partici-
pation in the process leading to the Policy Update is the antitrust concern of collu-
sion stemming from the capture of the process by a selected majority.111 In this
sense, the argument could be made that Policy Update constitutes a decision by
an association of undertakings having as effect the prevention, restriction or dis-
tortion of competition. Accordingly, the Policy Update might run afoul of
article 101 (1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU), which prohibits
agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and
concerted practices having as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or
distortion of competition within the EU internal market, and which have the poten-
tial to affect trade between Member States.
Given the global and widespread application of IEEE standards, virtually any
standard development activity of the IEEE can be caught by the antitrust jurisdic-
tion of the European Union. Speciﬁcally, article 101 (1) can be invoked to curb
anticompetitive practices which are predominantly or even exclusively carried
out outside the EU as long as there has been an implementation or an immediate,
substantial and foreseeable effect in the EU territory.112 The application of EU
competition law to the activities of the IEEE (-SA) is thus not precluded by the
incorporation of the Institute in the United States.
This section endeavours to do that in four parts. First, Section 5.1 illustrates the
inapplicability to the Policy Update of the so-called “safe harbour” provided for
standardization agreements under article 101 TFEU, concluding that a more sub-
stantive analysis is required. Second, Section 5.2 explains the four major amend-
ments introduced with the Updated Policy, suggesting that these may be
111These concerns were discussed in various occasions during and after the development of
the revised draft Patent Policy; see, for instance, Draft and Comments Received <http://
grouper.ieee.org/groups/pp-dialog/drafts_comments/> accessed 27 July 2016, letter sub-
mitted by Gregory Sidak to Deputy Assistant Attorney General Hesse on 28 January
2015 <https://www.criterioneconomics.com/proposed-ieee-bylaw-amendments-affecting-
frand-licensing-of-seps.html> accessed 27 July 2016.
112The European Court of Justice has accepted the extraterritorial application of EU com-
petition law in numerous occasions. For instance, in Dyestuffs (Case 48/69, Imperial
Chemical Industries Ltd. v Commission [1972] ECR-619) and Woodpulp (Joined Cases
89/85, 104/85, 114/85, 116/85, 117/85 and 125/85 to 129/85 hlström and Others v Commis-
sion [1988] ECR – 5193), the Court upheld jurisdiction where an agreement or concerted
practice had been implemented in the territory of the European Union, in particular
through subsidiaries or trading parties operating in the EU. Furthermore, in more recent
cases the General Court endorsed a theory of “qualiﬁed effects”, according to which the
Commission’s jurisdiction extends to conduct having immediate, substantial and foresee-
able effects in the European Union. See Case T-102/96, Gencor v Commission [1999]
ECR II-753; case T-286/09, Intel Corp. v Commission, currently on appeal to the ECJ).
It is thus not difﬁcult to imagine that, given the global application of IEEE standards,
EU jurisdiction can be exerted on the basis of the manufacturing and commercialization
decisions made by standard implementers, and the effects derived therefrom.
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considered a restriction of competition within the context of future IEEE standard-
ization activities. In a third stage, possible defences to claims of infringement of
article 101 TFEU are analysed. For example, one may reasonably claim that
certain restrictions of competition, such as those introduced through the Policy
Update, are objectively necessary to the establishment of a standardization agree-
ment. By the same token, it can be argued that the restrictions imposed by the new
IP Policy would generate efﬁciencies in accordance with the test devised in article
101 (3) TFEU, even if falling short of the “objective necessity” required under
article 101 (1). Although not necessarily providing a conclusive answer, Sections
5.3 and 5.4 will detail some of the elements that are relevant to the assessment of
the IEEE-SA’s Policy Update under these two inquiries.
5.1. Assessment under horizontal cooperation guidelines
The European Commission has facilitated the application of article 101 with the for-
mulation of both general guidelines on the application of article 101 (3),113 and more
speciﬁc guidelines which seek to clarify the interpretation of article 101 with regard
to certain types of agreements. The speciﬁc Guidelines of relevance for the assess-
ment of the Policy Update are the Horizontal Cooperation Guidelines,114 which
apply to agreements between actual or potential competitors to jointly engage in
R&D, production, purchasing, commercialization or standardization.
Standardization agreements, in particular, have as their primary objective the
deﬁnition of technical or quality requirements with which current or future pro-
ducts, production processes, services or methods may comply.115 While an
SSO’s Patent Policy does not directly or exclusively deﬁne those requirements,
its role in attracting technology developers and manufactures is such that it
deﬁnes “terms of access” to the relevant technical standard,116 at least in patent-
intensive sectors involving SEPs. For this reason, this Policy can be deemed
embedded (by incorporation) into speciﬁc standard-setting agreements involving
SEPs. It is thus possible to analyse the Policy within the context of each standard-
ization agreement to which it gives rise, assessing whether its rules of licensing
and disclosure give rise to actual or likely anticompetitive effects with regard to
a particular standard.
There is also one possible – albeit imperfect – way to conduct this assessment
in the abstract, namely by examining whether the Policy Update increases the
113Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty [2004] C 101/97 (“101(3)
Guidelines”).
114Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements [2011 ]C 11/1, further referred to
as ‘Guidelines’.
115Guidelines [257].
116See, by analogy, the Guidelines referring to the terms of access “to a particular quality
mark or for approval by a regulatory body.” ibid.
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likelihood that IEEE’s standardization falls foul of EU competition law. A ﬁrst
important step of that analysis is to verify whether the agreement concerning
the revision of the Policy would qualify for the so called “safe harbour”, which
implies immunity from scrutiny under EU competition law.
Pursuant to the Guidelines, standardization agreements “normally” fall outside
the scope of article 101 (1) as long as they comply with a set of four cumulative
requirements.117 Condition (1) of this safe harbour is unrestricted participation in
standard-setting,118 including impartial and non-discriminatory balloting pro-
cedures and objective criteria for selecting technology to be included in the stan-
dard.119 This requirement is amply fulﬁlled in the IEEE-SA’s standard-setting
procedures, which allow every party to join standards development stages and
ensure equality in the standards approval stage by prohibiting domination by a
single stakeholder group in the balloting process.120 The IEEE-SA also fulﬁls
this criterion by providing numerous occasions to approach and invite interested
parties for the work conducted in Study and Working Groups.121 However, an
opposite conclusion can be reached with regard to the process followed for the
2015 Policy Update: ﬁrst, the Policy was drafted by a close group of stakeholders
afﬁliated to companies with certain commercial interests, appointed through a
non-transparent process. Furthermore, no call for participation was issued prior
to establishing the Ad Hoc committee, keeping the concerned parties uninformed
about the drafting process.
Where the criterion of unrestricted participation cannot be fully met, the nega-
tive effects can be minimized by informing and consulting interested parties on the
drafting processes.122 In this regard, condition (2) of the safe harbour requires pro-
cedures for adopting the standard in question to be transparent, and the processes
leading to deﬁning a standard to take into account the interests of all stakeholders.
117Guidelines [278] and ff. The word “normally” used in the Guidelines seems to imply that
there may be exceptional circumstances under which the safe harbour would not apply, even
in the presence of all the requirements.
118This condition is based on the Commission Decision in case Ship Classiﬁcation. The
Commission’s preliminary view was that, given that all members of the International
Association of Classiﬁcation Societies (IACS) had a strong position on the relevant
market, the technical resolutions and standards of the IACS brought signiﬁcant competitive
disadvantages for the non-members of the IACS. In this regard, the Commission proposed
to adopt objective, transparent and non-discriminatory qualitative membership criteria. See
Commission Decision Ship Classiﬁcation of 14 October 2009 in Case 39.416, Ship Classi-
ﬁcation C (2009) 7796 [3.3] and [4.1].
119Guidelines [281].
120For a detailed explanation of IEEE-SA standard-setting procedures, see Nicolo Zingales
and Olia Kanevskaia, ‘The IEEE-SA Patent Policy Update under the Lens of EU Compe-
tition Law’ TILEC Discussion Paper 2016 – 31 <https://www.tilburguniversity.edu/
research/institutes-and-research-groups/tilec/research/publications/discussionpapers>,
Section 3.2.
121ibid.
122Guidelines [295].
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The standards development processes of the IEEE-SA fulﬁl those criteria by,
inter alia, making prior announcements of future meeting venues and publishing
the minutes of the meetings.123 However, the facts that the meetings of the Ad Hoc
took place in private, and that its minutes were not promptly (or ever, in the case of
the subcommittee) made available,124 suggest a more closed ecosystem, in stark
contrast with the notion of transparency put forward in the Guidelines. Moreover,
the criteria for the selection of members engaged in the drafting and approving
processes of the Ad Hoc and its subcommittee are missing from public documents.
Finally, it has been shown that the approval by PatCom, which led to the decision
to transfer the revised draft Policy for SASB consideration, was obtained by a vote
that does not reﬂect the consensus required for the development of IEEE-SA stan-
dard documents,125 and hence, PatCom did not take into account the interests and
views of all stakeholders when approving the Patent Policy draft.
Condition (3) of the safe-harbour relates to the voluntary character of the stan-
dards. This condition is where the assessment of the Policy under the safe harbour
becomes most challenging: is formal compliance with voluntariness sufﬁcient, or
does the context in which the Policy operates inﬂuence the understanding of
“voluntary”? In principle, SEP holders can choose in their LOAs to either grant
licences under FRAND or Z-FRAND (ie FRAND but without compensation) in
accordance with the updated Policy, or to be unwilling or unable to grant such
licences.126 As a matter of fact, however, the latter option is likely to lead to the
exclusion of the corresponding patents from the technology considered for the
standard.127
123See section 3.2.
124This was mentioned as a comment to the draft IEEE-SA Standards Board Bylaws on the
5th August 2013, see n 109.
125Following 2.1 of the IEEE-SA Standards Board Bylaws, ‘consensus is established when
substantial agreement has been reached by directly and materially affected interest cat-
egories’. In this regard, ‘substantial agreement means much more than a simple majority’.
126The range of options available recently changed with the latest version of form of LOA
available on the IEEE’s website. See <https://development.standards.ieee.org/myproject/
Public//mytools/mob/loa.pdf> accessed 15 September 2016. The revised form replaces
the one available in the immediate aftermath of the approval of the Policy, under which a
number of SEP holders exercised their ability to commit to licensing only according to
the rules of the pre-modiﬁcation version of the Patent Policy. See Susan Decker and Ian
King, ‘Qualcomm Says It Won’t Follow NewWi-Fi Rules on Patents’ Bloomberg Technol-
ogy (11 February 2015) www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-02-11/qualcomm-says-
new-wi-ﬁ-standard-rules-unfair-may-not-take-part accessed 10 August 2016; ‘Qualcomm
Says It Won’t Follow New Wi-Fi Rules on Patents’ (Bloomberg, 11 February 2015)
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-02-11/qualcomm-says-new-wi-ﬁ-standard-rules-
unfair-may-not-take-part accessed 10 August 2015; Richard Lloyd, ‘The IEEE’s new patent
policy one year on – the battle that’s part of a bigger licensing war’, IAM (6 May 2016)
<http://www.iam-media.com/blog/detail.aspx?g=e8f72d6e-a3f8-45d8-882f-3ebdd3a1d69e>
accessed 10 August 2016.
127See also n 74 and accompanying text.
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Condition (4) of the safe harbour refers to access to the standard on FRAND
terms. This aspect is obviously a crucial focus of the Policy Update, which aims to
ensure access to FRAND-committed SEPs by depriving SEP owners of the uncon-
ditional right to seek an injunction, and setting out a methodological basis for the
calculation of FRAND. The relevant question is whether these changes contribute
to making the resulting Policy clear and balanced, adapted to the needs of the
industry and the IEEE. While the concerns behind the Policy Update were dictated
by the concerns of uncertainty and rising litigation in the sector (ICT) most
affected by IEEE standards,128 the IEEE did not provide evidence of a pathologi-
cal situation129 warranting such drastic changes to the existing patent policy. Since
128See, inter alia, Konstantinos Karachalios (n 11); Request for BLR (n 11); and Renata
Hesse’s speech (n 66).
129To the contrary, many sources support the contrary position: see eg Reply Submission on
the Public Interest of Federal Trade Commissioners Maureen K. Ohlhausen and Joshua
D. Wright – In the Matter of Certain 3G Mobile Handsets and Components Thereof –
U.S. International Trade Commission (July 2015) <https://www.ftc.gov/system/ﬁles/
documents/public_statements/685811/150720itcreplyohlhausen-wright.pdf> accessed 8
August 2016; Alexander Galetovic, Stephen Haber and Ross Levine, ‘An Empirical Exam-
ination of Patent Hold-Up’ (2015) 11 Journal of Competition Law and Economics 5 (1).
J Gregory Sidak, ‘The Antitrust Division’s Devaluation of Standard-Essential Patents’
(n 13); J Gregory Sidak, ‘The Meaning of FRAND, Part II: Injunctions’ (2015) 11
Journal of Competition Law and Economics 201; Anne Layne-Farrar, ‘Patent Holdup
And Royalty Stacking Theory and Evidence: Where Do We Stand After 15 Years of
History?’ (December 2014), Submission for Item VII of the 122nd meeting of the
OECD Competition Committee on 17–18 December 2014 <http://www.oecd.org/
ofﬁcialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DAF/COMP/WD%282014%2984&
doclanguage=en> accessed 8 August 2016; Joshua D. Wright and Douglas H. Ginsburg,
‘Patent Assertion Entities and Antitrust: A Competition Cure for a Litigation Disease’
(2014) 79 Antitrust Law Journal 501; Kirti Gupta and Mark Snyder (n 9); J. Gregory
Sidak, ‘The Meaning of FRAND, Part I: Royalties’ (2013) 9 Journal of Competition
Law and Economics 931; Roger G. Brooks, ‘SSO Rules, Standardization, and SEP Licen-
sing: Economic Questions from the Trenches’ (2013) 9 Journal of Competition Law and
Economics 859; Kirti Gupta, ‘The Patent Policy Debate in the High-Tech World’ (2013)
9 Journal of Competition Law and Economics 827; Sir Robin Jacob, ‘Competition Auth-
orities Support Grasshoppers: Competition Law as a Threat to Innovation’, 9 (2013) Com-
petition Policy International 15; James Ratliff and Daniel L. Rubinfeld, ‘The Use and Threat
of Injunctions in the RAND Context’ (2013) 9 Journal of Competition Law and Economics
1; Gregor Langus, Vilen Lipatov and Damien Neven, ‘Standard-Essential Patents: Who Is
Really Holding Up (and When)?’ (2013) 9 Journal of Competition Law and Economics
253; Epstein, Kieff and Spulber (n 7); Richard S. Taffet and Hill B. Wellford, ‘Questioning
the FTC’s Incremental Value Test and Claims of Widespread Hold-Up in Technology Stan-
dards’ (2012) 57 Antitrust Bulletin 161; Luke Froeb, Bernhard Ganglmair and Gregory
J. Werden, ‘Patent Hold-Up and Antitrust: How a Well-Intentioned Rule Could Retard
Innovation’ (2012) 60 Journal of Industrial Economics 249; Mario Mariniello, ‘Fair,
Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory (FRAND) Terms: A Challenge for Competition Auth-
orities’, 7 (2011) Journal of Competition Law and Economics 523; Joshua D. Wright and
Aubrey N. Stuempﬂe, ‘Patent Holdup, Antitrust, and Innovation: Harness or Noose?’
(2010) 61 Alabama Law Review 559; Damien Geradin and Miguel Rato, ‘FRAND
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the Policy Update materially affects the bargaining frontier of SEP holders and
improves correspondingly the position of standard implementers, a doubt can be
cast as to whether the Patent Policy really reﬂects a balance between stakeholders.
In sum, the Policy Update appears to preclude the applicability of the safe
harbour to any standardization agreement resulting from the implementation of
that policy. Accordingly, scrutiny under EU competition law of any future stan-
dard produced by the IEEE-SA would require a substantive analysis of its
actual or likely welfare effects.
5.2. Analysis under article 101 TFEU of the amendments introduced by the
policy update
A substantive analysis of the Policy Update necessarily starts from an appreciation
of the potentially anticompetitive object or effect of amendments to IEEE-SA’s
Patent Policy. As mentioned, the most signiﬁcant changes of the Policy Update
are related to the duty of SEP holders to: (a) grant a licence to any compliant
implementation; (b) not seek injunctive relief, except where an implementer
fails to participate or comply with the outcome of an adjudication; (c) determine
their royalties including consideration of the value of speciﬁc elements; (d) not
request the cross-licensing of non-SEPs, or patents that are only essential to
other standards.
Commitment and EC Competition Law: A Reply to Philippe Chappatte’ (2010) 6 European
Competition Journal 129; Damien Geradin, ‘Pricing Abuses by Essential Patent Holders in
a Standard-Setting Context: A View from Europe’ (2009) 76 Antitrust Law Journal 329;
Bruce H. Kobayashi and Joshua D. Wright, ‘Federalism, Substantive Preemption, and
Limits on Antitrust: An Application to Patent Holdup’ (2009) 5 Journal of Competition
Law and Economics 469; J. Gregory Sidak, ‘Patent Holdup and Oligopsonistic Collusion
in Standard-Setting Organizations’ (2009) Journal of Competition Law and Economics 5
(1) 123; J Gregory Sidak ‘Holdup, Royalty Stacking, and the Presumption of Injunctive
Relief for Patent Infringement: A Reply to Lemley and Shapiro’, 92 Minnesota Law
Review 714 (2008); Einer R. Elhauge, ‘Do Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking Lead to
Systematically Excessive Royalties?’ (2008) 4 Journal of Competition Law and Economics
535 (2008); Damien Geradin, Anne Layne-Farrar and Jorge Padilla, ‘Competing Away
Market Power? An Economic Assessment of Ex Ante Auctions in Standard Setting’
(2008) 4 European Competition Journal 443; Vincenzo Denicolò, Damien Geradin, Anne
Layne-Farrar and Jorge Padilla, ‘Revisiting Injunctive Relief: Interpreting eBay in High
Tech Industries with Non-Practicing Patent Holders’ (2008) 4 Journal of Competition
Law and Economics 571; John M Golden, ‘Patent Trolls and Patent Remedies’ (2007)
85 Texas Law Review 2111; Damien Geradin and Miguel Rato, ‘Can Standard-Setting
Lead to Exploitative Abuse? A Dissonant View on Patent Hold-up, Royalty-Stacking
and the Meaning of FRAND’ (2007) 3 European Competition Law Journal 101; Damien
Geradin and Miguel Rato, ‘Can Standard-Setting Lead to Exploitative Abuse? A Dissonant
View on Patent Hold-Up, Royalty Stacking and the Meaning of FRAND’ (2007) 3 Euro-
pean Competition Journal 101; David J. Teece and Edward F. Sherry, ‘Standard Setting
and Antitrust’ (2003) 87 Minnesota Law Review 1913.
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5.2.1. “Any” and “smallest saleable” compliant implementation
The major problem for SEP holders stemming from requirements (a) and (c) is that
they imply a departure from the traditional licensing practice, where royalties are
based on a percentage of the ﬁnal price of any end-product that implements the
standard. This licensing system enables patent holders to appropriate the value
brought by their invention(s) to the product in question by demanding that end-
product manufacturers royalties are based on a percentage of the ﬁnal price,
rather than the contribution that the patent(s) make(s) to the multiple components
constituting that product. There is no question that, by forcing SEP holders to grant
licences at all levels of production and mandating the consideration of the value of
the SSCI as a royalty base, the Policy Update disrupts the existing licensing prac-
tice, generating both transaction and adjustment costs for existing SEP holders.130
This disruption also makes it harder to reﬂect in royalty payments any added value
stemming from the integration of different components, which, by contrast under
the new Policy must be spread proportionally across the royalty rates of SSCIs.
However, the relevant question is whether such disruption results in cognizable
competitive harm.
Critics of the new Policy have pointed to the fact that it constitutes a coordi-
nated interference with the price system, allegedly resulting in underinvestment
and limiting innovation.131 So far, only one critique has levied such allegation
in the context of EU competition law.132 In particular, Petit suggests that IEEE’s
attempt to clarify “reasonable” rates may violate article 101 TFEU following an
incipiency theory, which aims to “nip” anticompetitive behaviour “in the bud”.
He bases this argument on his reading of the recent Bananas case,133 where the
European Court of Justice held that exchange of certain pre-pricing communi-
cations constitutes infringement by object, where it is capable of removing uncer-
tainty between participants as to the operation of the market in question.134
However, no speciﬁc justiﬁcation is offered for extrapolating from Bananas a
general prohibition of coordinated action consisting of a (recommended)
methodology for calculation of the ﬁnal price, as opposed to speciﬁc quotation
130See in this respect Nicolas Petit, ‘The Smallest Salable Patent-Pricing Unit experiment,
general purpose technologies and the Coase theorem’ (February 2016) <http://www.
4ipcouncil.com/application/ﬁles/8914/5554/8353/SSPPU_rule_GPTs_and_the_Coase_
Theorem_-_N_Petit_15_02_16.pdf> accessed 8 August 2016.
131Sidak, ‘The Antitrust Division’s Devaluation of Standard-Essential Patents’ (n 13);
Teece (n 11); Hofﬁnger (n 11); Marco Lo Bue, ‘Are These Cartels? Price Guidelines
Adopted by Standard Setting Organisations (US, Institute of Electrical and Electronics
Engineers)’ (2016) 7 (6) Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, 367.
132Petit, ‘The IEEE-SA Revised Patent Policy and Its Deﬁnition of ’Reasonable’ Rates’
(n 13).
133Case C-286/13 P – Dole Food and Dole Fresh Fruit Europe v Commission, not yet
published.
134[121–22].
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prices exchanged between competitors.135 Even accepting an interpretation of
the updated Policy to the effect that a “reasonable” royalty must be based
inter alia on the SSCI value and on the contribution of the patent to its function-
ality, the validity of this as an indicator of price-ﬁxing, either actual or in incipi-
ence, is dubious. The Policy demands that negotiations simply factor in the
aforementioned values, but says nothing on the multiplier (ie the actual royalty
rate) that an SEP holder can charge in relation to those values. The Policy
simply forces SEP holders to adopt a common metric, thereby fragmenting the
amount of royalties sought across different components, and thus presumably
facilitating comparisons and market transparency.136 Of course, transparency
may also have adverse effects on competition, in a market characterized
by price parallelism and exhibiting additional “plus factors” from which the
existence of a coordinated conduct can be inferred.137 But withdraw those
135See the high standard for “by object” infringements indicated by the Guidelines on Hori-
zontal Cooperation, referring to T-Mobile Netherlands, Case C-8/08, [2009] ECR I-4529
[37] (where ﬁve mobile operators in the Netherlands agreed at a meeting to reduce standard
dealer remunerations for postpaid subscriptions) and French Beef, Joined Cases T-217/03
and T-245/03, [2006] ECR II-4987 [84] (where a cooperative of cattle and slaughterhouses
adopted a “recommended” slaughterhouse entry price scale for certain categories of cattle,
that was in fact perceived as a minimum price scale requirement).
136Contrast this type of systemic and one-off coordination with the more episodic and
dynamic type of coordination sanctioned by the Commission in the Air Cargo cartel
decision, where several carriers were found at fault of infringing article 101 TFEU for
having adhered to collusive devices facilitating the coordination of commercial behavior.
In particular, the Commission took issue with the parties’ ability through these devices to
“exchange […] of information concerning their respective deliveries, which not only
covers deliveries already made but is intended to facilitate constant monitoring of
current deliveries in order to ensure that the cartel is sufﬁciently effective” (emphasis
added). See Case COMP/39258 – Airfreight, Commission Decision of 9/11/2010 (pub-
lished on 8 May 2015) [853]. This decision was subsequently annulled by the General
Court, but on different grounds: see Case T-534/11, Schenker AG v Commission, ECLI:
EU:T:2014:854.
137According to Richard Posner, who led the discussion with his seminal article in 1969,
“plus factors” include: inelasticity of demand; high entry barriers; market concentration;
effective mechanisms of coordinating, monitoring and enforcing coordination (including
the possibility to punish deviators); evidence of past performance, such as systematic
price discrimination, prolonged excess capacity over demand, infrequent price changes,
price leadership, abnormally high proﬁts, ﬁxed market shares over a substantial period
time, ﬁling of identical sealed bids on non-standard items, refusal to offer discounts
where there is substantial excess capacity, price increase announcements far in advance,
and public statements of what the seller considers the right price for the industry to main-
tain. See Richard Posner, ‘Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested Approach’, 21
Stanford Law Review (1969), 1562. Despite the crucial importance of Posner’s proposal
in advancing theory and research on oligopolistic collusion, both legal and economic
theory have moved beyond the aforementioned “checklist” approach, retaining only a frac-
tion of the suggested “plus factors” and expanding the list to include strategic consider-
ations. See Europe Economics “Study on assessment criteria for distinguishing between
224 N. Zingales and O. Kanevskaia
features,138 it appears that critics of the Policy Update have cried the “spectre” of
price-ﬁxing without demonstrating a sufﬁcient likelihood that it does materialize.
Under these circumstances, it seems inappropriate to place such restrictions into
the “object” category. Nevertheless, the qualiﬁcation of the recommended method-
ology as a restriction of competition cannot be excluded in light of its potential
price suppression effects in the market for a speciﬁc standards-enabled product.
Ultimately, this assessment depends on the actual impact that the Policy Update
will have on licensing practices, speciﬁcally the degree to which it is likely to
result in lower royalties and reduced innovation in the speciﬁc market in question.
5.2.2. Cross-licences
A similar type of problem raised by the Policy Update is its treatment of cross-
licensing (requirement (d)), which prevents companies from designing licensing
programmes demanding reciprocity for patents unrelated or not essential to the
standard in question. The rationale of this provision is clearly one of restricting
the ability of SEP holders to leverage their market power into a different
market. Furthermore, the fact that this rule pushes SEP holders to indicate
royalty-based licensing arrangements for their non-SEPs enhances transparency
of their pricing, contributing to creating a more intelligible licensing regime.
The criticism against it is, once again, one of disruption of the existing licensing
practices – which heavily rely on portfolio cross-licensing to simplify nego-
tiations.139 That disruption also increases the likelihood of higher prices down-
stream as a result of royalty stacking, a phenomenon whereby the royalties of
various complementary patents “stack up”, one above the other, potentially
raising a barrier to commercialization.140 This is simply a manifestation of the
so called “Cournot complements” problem, according to which the overall price
competitive and dominant oligopolies in merger control”, Report for the European Com-
mission Enterprise Directorate (May 2001) <http://ec.europa.eu/DocsRoom/documents/
2657/attachments/1/translations/en/renditions/pdf> accessed 8 August 2016;
William. E. Kovacic, Robert C. Marshall, Leslie M. Marx, Halbert L. White, ‘Plus
Factors and Agreements in Antitrust Law’ (2011) 3 (11) Michigan Law Review 393;
Nicolas Petit, ‘The oligopoly problem in EU competition law’, in Ioannis Lianos and
Damien Geradin (ed.) Handbook on European Competition Law (Edward Elgar 2013).
138Petit himself refers to this scenario as a second hypothesis for the application of EU com-
petition law to the IEEE-SA’s Policy, though short of elaborating on the relevant analytical
framework. See Petit, ‘The IEEE-SA Revised Patent Policy and Its Deﬁnition of ’Reason-
able’ Rates’ (n 11) 16.
139Carl Shapiro, ‘Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard
Setting’, in Adam B. Jaffe et. Al (ed.) Innovation policy & the economy (National Academy
of Science, 2001) 119, 132.
140Damien Geradin, Anne-Layne Farrrar and Jorge Padilla, ‘The Complements Problem
Within Standard Setting: Assessing The Evidence On Royalty Stacking’ (2008) 14
Boston University Journal of Science & Technology Law 144, 145.
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for complementary inputs sold by different ﬁrms tends to be higher than the price
obtained when those inputs (in this case, patents) are sold by a single ﬁrm
altogether.141 Cross-licensing solves this problem at least among two ﬁrms,142
by allowing the consolidation of negotiations between holders of complementary
patents: the more cross-licensing there is for SEPS of a given standard, the lower it
is likely to be the cost for implementers to make standard-compliant products. It
follows that the Policy Update may result in higher prices for consumers, or
prevent the emergence of potentially innovative products due to the higher pro-
duction costs incurred by end-product manufacturers. However, it should be
noted that the impact of this amended rule is limited, since (as noted by the
DoJ)143 it leaves parties free to voluntarily negotiate broader portfolio cross-
licences. In practice, one can expect such requests to become the subject of
routine bilateral negotiations, instead of a mandatory condition of a predeﬁned
“licensing programme”. Once again, the actual effect of the updated Policy
depends on the extent to which licensing practices will effectively change the
negotiating strategies of SEP holders.
5.2.3. Injunctive relief
The third type of problem raised by the Policy Update is the interference in the
balance of power of negotiations between SEP holders and standard implementers
by limiting the availability of injunctive relief. Speciﬁcally, requirement (b)
deprives SEP holders of the ability to seek such relief except in very limited
(above-mentioned144) exceptional circumstances. By transforming SEP entitle-
ments from a “property” into a “liability” rule,145 this amendment reduces the bar-
gaining power of SEP holders vis a vis implementers, who in turn remain free to
use the “threat” of an infringement, validity, or essentiality challenge as a bargain-
ing chip to obtain lower royalty rates.146 Considering the probabilistic nature of
patents,147 it is but logical to expect that patent owners will decrease the rates
they seek from implementers in order to minimize the chances that negotiations
141Augustin Cournot, Researches Into the Mathematical Principles of the Theory of Wealth
(Nathaniel T. Bacon trans., The Macmillan Co 1985) (1838).
142Carl Shapiro (n 137) 130.
143Business Review Letter (n 12) 4.
144See beginning of section 4.1.
145Guido Calabresi and A Douglas Melamed, ‘Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalien-
ability: One View of the Cathedral’ (1972) 85 Harvard Law Review, 1089.
146Pierre Larouche and Nicolo Zingales, ‘Injunctive Relief in Disputes Related to Standard-
Essential Patents: Time for the CJEU to Set Fair and Reasonable Presumptions ‘(2014) 10
European Competition Journal 551, 592–93.
147The term “probabilistic” refers to the fact that patents are signiﬁcantly affected by uncer-
tainty about (1) the commercial signiﬁcance of the invention being patented, and (2) the val-
idity and scope of the legal right being granted. See Mark Lemley and Carl Shapiro,
‘Probabilistic Patents’ (2005) 19 (2) Journal of Economic Perspectives, 75.
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turn into a costly litigation or arbitration process. This measure is therefore likely
to materially affect the royalty rate, and conceivably result in a reduction of invest-
ment and innovation. That effect is compounded by the prohibition imposed by the
new Policy to base royalty rates on past licences, where such licences were
obtained under the (explicit or implicit) threat of an injunction.148
It should also be noted that, contrary to the DoJ’s assessment of US law, this
aspect of the Policy is signiﬁcantly more restrictive than the current state of EU
competition law. As clariﬁed by the recent judgment of the Court of Justice of
the EU in Huwaei v ZTE,149 SEP holders do not incur antitrust liability for
seeking injunctive relief as long as they have alerted a potential licensee of an
alleged infringement and presented written offer for a licence on FRAND terms.
This safe harbour is not available under the Policy, which accordingly incentivizes
SEP holders to obtain negotiated solutions by demanding lower royalties than
those they would otherwise request – and thus adversely impacting their incentives
to innovate. Although upholding this conclusion would require a court or the
Commission to apply a somewhat consequentialist reasoning, it is not difﬁcult
to imagine it being supported by evidence of declining SEP royalties and
slower pace of technological innovation. While that empirical assessment can
be left for future research or speciﬁc case analysis, sufﬁces it to say that this par-
ticular amendment of the Policy may under certain circumstances be considered a
restriction by effect under article 101 TFEU.
5.3. Ancillarity
Despite any potential anticompetitive effect, the updated Policy may escape
article 101 TFEU to the extent that any restrictions of competition it imposes
are “ancillary”, ie objectively necessary to the pursuit of a legitimate aim.
This concept has been integral part of EU competition law since early cases
such as Societe’ Technique Miniere v Mascinenabau Ulm, where the Court
held that an exclusive licence to a distributor does not infringe article 101 (1)
to the extent that it is “really necessary for the penetration of a new area by
an undertaking”.150 The issue of necessity was also central in evaluating the
arrangement of exclusive licensing to intellectual property in Nungesser151 and
Coditel,152 both revolving around the determination of whether the exclusivity
granted by the agreements in question was proportionate to attract sufﬁcient
investment.
148See Patent Policy, sec 6.1, deﬁnition of “Reasonable Rate”.
149Case C-170/13, 16 July 2015 – Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd v ZTE Corp (not yet
published).
150Case 56/65, Société Technique Minière v Maschinenbau Ulm [1966] ECR 235, at 250.
151Case 258/78, Nungesser KG and Kurt Eisele v Commission [1982] ECR 2015.
152Case 262/81, Coditel SA v Cine Vog Films SA (No 2) [1982] [2001] ECR II-02459.
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Yet the ﬁrst explicit recognition of the doctrine occurred in Metropole Tele-
vision v Commission,153 where the General Court extrapolated from its guide-
lines for the assessment of joint ventures (and in particular, the notices on
ancillary restrictions154 and on joint ventures155), the rule that “ancillary
restraints” refers to those that are “necessary” to implement a given oper-
ation.156 Speciﬁcally, the evaluation of “necessity” cannot imply an assessment,
in the light of the competitive situation on the relevant market, of whether the
restriction is indispensable to the commercial success of the main operation,157
or the establishment of the undertaking on the market on a long-term basis.158 In
other words, indispensability cannot be used to justify restrictions that serve to
secure proﬁts going beyond mere commercial viability. This rigid approach to
the interpretation of necessity was conﬁrmed by the recent judgment in Master-
card v Commission, where the Court held that the mere fact that the operation is
more difﬁcult to implement without the restriction, or even less proﬁtable, is not
sufﬁcient to claim “objective necessity”.159 What this strict necessity test implies
for the restrictions imposed by the Policy Update is that any justiﬁcation under
the ancillarity doctrine would need to overcome an extremely demanding test.
While it can be admitted that certain rules of SSOs (such as FRAND commit-
ments and good faith disclosure of IP) might qualify as necessary safeguards for
the existence of a standardization agreement in the market in question, the key
question to be addressed is whether any of the features introduced by the new
Policy would be required for the conduct of standard-setting. Given the success-
ful operation of the IEEE-SA under its previous Patent Policy, this defence is
not likely to be a sufﬁcient obstacle to any possible challenge of the Policy
Update.
There is however another possible line of “ancillarity” defence which could
grant the IEEE-SA more leeway in the adoption of its policy. Whereas the majority
of cases referred to a notion of ancillarity based on necessity for a commercial
transaction, a few of them revolved around necessity for the fulﬁlment of a so-
called “regulatory” function entrusted to a particular private entity. In
153Case T-112/99 Métropole télévision (M6), Suez-Lyonnaise des eaux, France Télécom
and Télévision française 1 SA (TF1) v Commission of the European Communities [2001]
ECR II-02459.
154Commission Notice on restrictions directly related and necessary to concentrations, OJ
2005 C 56, 05.03.2005, 24-31.
155Notice on the concept of full-function joint ventures OJ C 66, 02.03.1998, 1.
156[109].
157[115].
158Metropole (n 153) [120].
159Case C-382/12, MasterCard Inc. and Others v European Commission (not yet pub-
lished) [91]. Note that this seems to overrule the standard proposed by the Commission
in its Guidelines, which refers to difﬁculty in implementation of the non-restrictive trans-
action as a valid basis for ancillarity claims. See 101 (3) Guidelines [31] (emphasis added).
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Wouters,160 the Court developed this doctrine for the ﬁrst time answering a pre-
liminary reference concerning the compatibility with article 101 (1) TFEU (then
art 85 (1) of the EC Treaty) of a decision by the legal bar association to prohibit
multi-disciplinary partnerships (in particular, between lawyer and accountants).
The Court ruled that to determine the compatibility with article 101 (1), account
must be taken of the objectives pursued by the decision of the association,
which it found to be connected
with the need to make rules relating to organization, qualiﬁcations, professional
ethics, supervision and liability, in order to ensure that the ultimate consumer of
legal services and the sound administration of justice are provided with the necessary
guarantees in relation to integrity and experience.161
It also noted that the applicable legal framework entrusted the Bar of the Nether-
lands with responsibility for adopting regulations designed to ensure the proper
practice of the profession, and that the decision in question did not go beyond
what was necessary to achieve that objective.162 In a nutshell, the Court seemed
to imply that this particular notion of ancillarity would apply when a private
body: (a) is acting for the pursuit of the public interest; and (b) derives its
powers from public law. Subsequent judgments have conﬁrmed this ancillarity
doctrine for other private bodies with public law origin, such as the Portuguese
Order of Chartered Accountants (Oﬁciais de Conta),163 the Association of
Italian Geologists (Italian Geologists)164 and the Italian Observatory for road
trafﬁc safety and social security (Consulta generale per l’autotrasporto e la logis-
tica).165 Interestingly for possible appeal to this doctrine by the IEEE, the notion
has been extended to regulatory bodies recognized by international law, such as
the International Olympic Committee (Meca Medina).166 However, it remains
controversial whether such doctrine can be invoked by private organizations
that have not been ofﬁcially entrusted with authority by either the State or the
160Case C-309/99 Wouters and others v Algemene Raad van de Nederlandse Orde van
Advocaten [2002] ECR I-1577.
161[97].
162In this speciﬁc case, proper practice of the profession was ensured by preserving the
ability of lawyers to satisfy the professional requirements of independence and strict pro-
fessional secrecy, not imposed to accountants to a comparable degree. See [103].
163Case C-1/12 Ordem dos Técnicos Oﬁciais de Contas v Autoridade da Concorrência
[2013] 4 CMLR 20.
164Case C-136/12, Consiglio nazionale dei geologi v Autorità garante della concorrenza e
del mercato and Autorità garante della concorrenza e del mercato v Consiglio nazionale
dei geologi [2013] 5 CMLR 40.
165Joined Cases C-184/13 to C-187/13, C-194/13, C-195/13 and C-208/13, API – Anonima
Petroli Italiana SpA not yet reported.
166Case C 519/04 P., David Meca-Medina and Igor Majcen v Commission of the European
Communities [2006] ECR I-06991.
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international community.167 The ECJ ruling in Slovak Banks168 seems to suggest
that this cannot be the case, in reasserting EU competition law’s view that it is for
public authorities, and not private undertakings, to ensure compliance with statu-
tory requirements.169 This would seem to apply a fortiori where undertakings
appeal to the pursuit of self-proclaimed public interests in order to take actions
which amount to an infringement of competition law.
In short, the challenge for a regulatory ancillarity defence in this context is to
establish its application to hybrid bodies, like SSOs, that are neither public in
origin (not having been ofﬁcially created or recognized by law) nor in nature
(its membership being constituted predominantly by private entities), but whose
mission is to serve the public interest.170 While a tenuous argument could be
made that the conferral of authority to IEEE’s standards by its accreditation as
an American Standard Developer.171 constitutes an informal delegation of
power,172 the applicability of the defence appears to be in any case jeopardized
by the breach of the speciﬁc principles under which such delegated activity was
supposed to take place: namely, the ANSI requirements and the overarching prin-
ciples of the IEEE.
5.4. Efﬁciency
If the Policy is found to fall within the scope of article 101 (1), this does not
necessarily lead to a violation of EU competition law. A restriction can be justiﬁed
pursuant to article 101 (3) if the agreement, decision or concerted practice contrib-
utes to improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting technical
or economic progress (1), while allowing consumers to get a fair share of the
167In this sense, see Richard Wish and David Bailey, Competition Law (5th ed., Oxford Uni-
versity Press 2015) 141. Cf Katarina Pijetlovic, EU Sports Law and Breakaway Leagues in
Football (Springer, 2015) 153–54.
168Case C-68/12, Protimonopolný úrad Slovenskej republiky v Slovenská sporiteľňa a.s.,
EU:C:2013:71 [20].
169See, in the context of unilateral conduct, Case T-30/89 Hilti v Commission [1991] ECR
II-1439 [118–19]; See also Case T-83/91 Tetra Pak International v Commission (Tetra Pak
II) [1994] ECR II-755 [83], [84] and [138].
170See n 37. See also “IEEE Standards and the Law.What You Need to Know”, available on
IEEE’s website at <http://standards.ieee.org/develop/policies/stdslaw.pdf> accessed 15
September 2016, according to which “IEEE is a Section 501(c)(3) tax-exempt organization
as deﬁned by the United States Tax Code. As such, IEEE is obligated to serve the public
good through its educational and scientiﬁc endeavours […] Standards beneﬁt the public
in part by advancing technology and enabling competition. Therefore, IEEE standards par-
ticipants need to follow certain guidelines in order to maintain the Section 501(c)(3) status
of IEEE”. The document refers to the principles of Openness, Due Process, Balance, Right
of Appeal and Consensus, which are largely overlapping with the ANSI requirements and
the TBT Code of Good Practice.
171See n 41.
172See NTTAA (n 42).
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resulting beneﬁt (2), and neither it imposes on the undertakings concerned restric-
tions which are not indispensable to the attainment of these objective (3), nor it
leads to competition being eliminated in a substantial part of the market (4).
Were article 101 (3) to be invoked in the context of a challenge to the Policy
Update, there would appear to be little difﬁculty in satisfying the ﬁrst prong of
its test: the Policy Update does contribute to an improvement in the production
of goods, in particular those products requiring the use of standards and SEPs,
as it provides greater clarity and transparency with regard to the rules applicable
to SEP claims.
Each of the four described amendments of the Policy seem to fare well under
this prong, either improving production or even promoting technical and economic
progress, thanks to the multiplier effect of standardization.
First, the rule mandating licensing to any compliant implementation opens up
the market of component parts, which may drive down prices for standardized pro-
ducts and increase the possibilities for consumers to seek replacement of any such
relevant part (as opposed to buying a whole new end-product) in case of failure or
malfunctioning. The beneﬁt would also easily satisfy the second prong of the test,
given the immediate gain for ﬁnal consumers of the ﬁnal products.
As to the second element, the rule concerning the royalty base formulation has
the value of providing a focal point for negotiation, thereby making cost savings
which could ultimately ﬂow to the beneﬁt of consumers in the form of lower prices
and increased quality or innovation (to the satisfaction of the second prong).
The third element, that is the rule prohibiting SEP holders to seek injunctions
before adjudication, serves to prevent opportunistic rent-seeking (through the
threat of injunctions) by depriving SEP holders of an “outside option” from the
negotiations table. This facilitates or even accelerates standards adoption, thus pro-
viding a beneﬁt to technological progress and the production of goods; and it is
reasonable to expect a quick transfer of the beneﬁt to ﬁnal consumers, although
also likely negative long-term consequences for innovation.
Fourth and ﬁnally, the rule prohibiting bundled cross-licensing preserves the
autonomy and subsistence of implementers (particularly small and medium sized
ones) in the relevant technology market, by enabling their implementation of the
standard without incurring the costs of patents, which may be substitute for their
own technology. Only the passing-on element may be less evident here, as the
rule merely protects the interests of implementers, which does not necessarily trans-
late into a beneﬁt for consumers downstream. To the contrary, it might actually result
in higher prices and reduced innovation due to royalty stacking.
When it comes to indispensability (the third prong), it is important to note that,
although the test of article 101 (3) appears on its face as demanding as article 101
(1), the Commission has suggested a more ﬂexible interpretation, by referring to
any restriction being “reasonably necessary” for the efﬁciency in question.173
173[73].
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Importantly, the focus of this analysis is not whether in the absence of the restric-
tion the agreement would not have been concluded (as in the case of ancillarity),
but rather whether more efﬁciencies are produced with the agreement or restriction
than in the absence of the agreement or restriction.174 According to the Commis-
sion, counterfactuals offered by the undertakings will be readily accepted, unless it
is reasonably clear that there are realistic and attainable alternatives.175 In prin-
ciple, this seems to militate in favour of a sufﬁcient ﬂexibility of article 101 (3)
to legitimize the pursuit of the general goal of the Policy Update: to provide
clarity and transparency. However, it seems particularly difﬁcult to justify the
forced renunciation of injunctive relief (prior to ﬁnal adjudication) as the least
restrictive alternative: if the desired effect was to provide limits against opportu-
nistic use of injunctions, that could also be achieved, for example, by establishing
a “safe harbour” framework similar to the one developed by the ECJ inHuwaei,176
or the Commission in Samsung.177 This type of measure was both realistic and
attainable within the IEEE-SA, and would have been signiﬁcantly less impactful
on the bargaining position of SEP holders, and their ability to recoup investments.
The ﬁnal question for the application of article 101 (3) is whether the Policy
Update is likely to lead to the elimination of competition in respect of a substantial
part of the products concerned. Answering this question requires an appreciation
of the sources of competition, which will vary depending on the goods affected by
standardization, including the intellectual property involved.178 As the new Policy
may affect competition between technology providers for inclusion in a standard,
one can expect the market(s) for technology (ie the relevant patents) to be signiﬁ-
cantly impacted. In this regard, the Guidelines make clear that competition in the
technology market would be carefully assessed if it appears that an agreement may
lead to the exclusion of valid alternative technology.179 An efﬁciency defence is
therefore unlikely to succeed if the price suppression effect drives out of IEEE
standardization a sufﬁcient number of industry players with important technology
portfolios, as it appears the opposing declarations made by major SEP contributors
such as Qualcomm, Nokia and Ericsson180 following approval of the Policy
174[74].
175[75] (emphasis added).
176See in particular [60–69].
177Samsung – Enforcement of UMTS standard essential patents (Case AT.39939) Commis-
sion Decision C (2014) 2891 ﬁnal.
178The Guidelines distinguish four possible types of relevant markets that may be impacted
by standardization agreements (the market for the product or services to which the standard
or standards relates; the relevant technology market; the market for standard-setting; and the
market for testing and certiﬁcation). Guidelines [261]. Only the second type (relevant tech-
nology market) is relevant to this theoretical analysis of the Policy Update.
179[120].
180See Susan Decker and Ian King, ‘Qualcomm Says It Won’t Follow New Wi-Fi Rules on
Patents’ Bloomberg Technology (11 February 2015) <www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2015-02-11/qualcomm-says-new-wi-ﬁ-standard-rules-unfair-may-not-take-part> accessed
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Update. Unsurprisingly, this trend is reﬂected in a sharply declining number of
LOAs submitted in the year following adoption of the new Policy.181
6. Conclusion
This paper sought to examine the legality of the recent IEEE-SA Patent Policy
Update under EU competition law. Despite the complexity and speciﬁcity of the
assessment that would be required for each standard developed under the
revised Policy, it has been possible to conduct a generalized assessment with
regard to the amendments introduced by the Policy Update, and speciﬁcally
their likely impact on the technology market. This assessment was grounded on
the recognition that the Policy constitutes an integral part of future standardization
agreements within the IEEE, and therefore can be analysed as such, under the fra-
mework deﬁned by the European Commission in its Guidelines on Horizontal
Cooperation.
The Guidelines offer a “safe harbour” to shield these important agreements
from potential antitrust liability under speciﬁc conditions. However, unlike tra-
ditional standard-setting activity in the IEEE-SA, the process followed for the
introduction of amendments of the Policy Update fails to meet those conditions,
particularly in view of its deﬁciencies in terms of transparency and consensus.
While the IEEE-SA ensures equality of stakeholders and openness of standard-
setting procedures, limited participation and procedural omissions in the course
of policy-development prevented the IEEE-SA from establishing a balanced
Patent Policy, thereby precluding the application of the “safe harbour” to standard-
ization agreements concluded on the basis of the revised Policy.
This ineligibility for safe harbour opens up the possibility for undertakings
adversely affected by IEEE standard-setting to use article 101 TFEU in order to
invalidate an adopted standard, and impose liability on the IEEE-SA members
involved in its development. The prospect of success for such claims was assessed
under a four-step analytical framework.
First, it was established that the amendments introduced by the policy do not
give rise to an infringement “by object”, at least in the absence of additional
10 August 2016; ‘Qualcomm Says It Won’t Follow New Wi-Fi Rules on Patents’ (Bloom-
berg, 11 February 2015) <www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-02-11/qualcomm-says-
new-wi-ﬁ-standard-rules-unfair-may-not-take-part> accessed 10 August 2015; Richard
Lloyd, ‘The IEEE’s new patent policy one year on – the battle that’s part of a bigger licen-
sing war’, IAM (6 May 2016) <http://www.iam-media.com/blog/detail.aspx?g=e8f72d6e-
a3f8-45d8-882f-3ebdd3a1d69e> accessed 10 August 2016.
181See Ron Katznelson, ‘Decline in non-duplicate licensing Letters of Assurance (LOAs)
from Product/System companies for IEEE standards’, Presentation at IEEE GLOBECOM,
San Diego (December 2015) <https://works.bepress.com/rkatznelson/80/> accessed 10
August 2016. Katznelson documents a steep decline in Letter of Assurances submitted
by product/system companies after March 2015.
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elements indicating the existence of collusion. This means that the outcome of the
article 101 TFEU analysis will depend signiﬁcantly on the circumstances affecting
the standard and the market in question.
Secondly, a preliminary assessment suggested that certain amendments have in
themselves the potential to raise competitive concerns, in particular for the effects
that they may have on licensing royalties, and ultimately on SEP holders’ incen-
tives to innovate.
Thirdly, it was shown that the introduced amendments are unlikely to be seen
as necessary to the pursuit of standard-setting activity, in light of the stringency of
the commercial ancillarity test and the failure by the IEEE-SA to fulﬁl the con-
ditions for application of the regulatory ancillarity doctrine. In particular, it is
highly questionable that the deprivation of SEP holders from injunctions be
strictly required for the existence of an SSO, and it is hard to claim that the
IEEE-SA acted in the public interest when it violated the principles under
which its activities are supposed to take place.182
Fourth and ﬁnally, a tentative application of article 101.3 to the amendments
that produced ambivalent results, depending primarily on the fulﬁlment of its
fourth condition: ie whether the agreement leads to the elimination of competition
in a substantial part of the common market. Critical to that determination is the
signiﬁcance of the technology portfolios of the industry players that have
denounced the new Policy, and refused to submit LOAs for participation in
future IEEE standardization. Since the patent policy is not severable from the
main standardization agreement, an afﬁrmative answer would lead to a condemna-
tion of undertakings involved in the standard-setting, as well as the IEEE for
having facilitated coordination necessary for the achievement of any identiﬁed
anticompetitive effects.
All in all, this analysis showed that the patent policy of SSOs is a delicate
matter, involving a careful balance between its incentivizing and prophylactic
functions. SSOs are advised to seek that balance by keeping obligations on SEP
holders within reasonable limits, in particular ensuring that any such obligations
be either the result of solid consensus between SSO members, or demonstrably
necessary for the conduct of standard-setting. If on the one hand it is logical for
SSOs to seek to offer their members protection against widespread concerns in
the industry, it is also important to prevent the use of the standard-setting frame-
work for redistribution between winners and losers in the risky and uncertain
process of technological innovation.183
182Such as the procedures of the IEEE, the ANSI requirements and the TBT Code of Good
practice. See n 56–59 and corresponding text.
183See in this sense also CEN-CENELEC’s position paper ‘Standard Essential Patents and
Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory Commitments’ (September 2016) <http://www.
cencenelec.eu/News/Policy_Opinions/PolicyOpinions/EssentialPatents.pdf> accessed 15
September 2016, p 14.
234 N. Zingales and O. Kanevskaia
Disclosure statement
No potential conﬂict of interest was reported by the authors.
Appendix 1. Scheme procedure of IEEE-SA 2015 patent policy update
European Competition Journal 235
